relied upon the uncharged crime of assault in imposing punishment. In
Wolff v McDonnell (
418 US 539 ), the Supreme Court held that due process requires advance written notice of the claimed violation. Wolff provided the impetus for the enactment of 7 NYCRR 253.2 (b), which states,
inter alia, that “[t]he formal charge shall consist of a written specification of the particulars of the incident of behavior involved and the date, time and place of such incident”. A review of the record reveals that, contrary to petitioners’ argument, fair and adequately detailed notice was given each petitioner with respect to the charges. Moreover, the record does not support petitioners’ assertion that the hearing officer misunderstood the charges and, accordingly, went beyond the scope of the charges. The hearing officer did ask petitioners whether they had assaulted any officers. However, as petitioners were charged with participating in a riot situation
which caused injury to several correction officers, the hearing officer was entitled to ascertain the degree of petitioners’ participation in the subject disturbance regardless of whether the assault charges were dropped. Petitioners’ next assertion is that the hearing officer failed to comply with the provisions of 7 NYCRR 253.4 (e). This regulation provides, in pertinent part, that after interviewing the inmate and other witnesses and considering reports of the incident and the adjustment committee records, the hearing officer: “shall then once again interview the inmate and shall advise him of the factual circumstances that appear to support the charge and shall afford him an opportunity to comment thereon and to make any statement he may care to submit with respect to the charge” (7 NYCRR 253.4 [e]). A review of the record reveals that in neither instance were petitioners advised of the factual circumstances supporting the charges against them. Rather, petitioners were only advised of the various sources relied on by the hearing officer in reaching his determination. This omission by the hearing officer is particularly troublesome since, although petitioners each had a copy of their misbehavior report and the formal charges, neither was aware of the substance of the correction officer’s testimony inculpating them, nor, it would appear from the record, of the specifics of the March 22, 1982 incident as relayed in various departmental reports considered by the hearing officer. Although, as respondents assert, nothing in 7 NYCRR 253.4 requires that an inmate have disclosed to him all the evidence gathered, 7 NYCRR 253.4 (e) unequivocally requires that petitioners be informed of the facts supporting the charge. The records of the subject superintendent’s proceedings fail to indicate meaningful compliance therewith. To hold otherwise would render the latter part of 7 NYCRR 253.4 (e), which requires that the inmate be afforded an opportunity to comment on the evidence, meaningless. The judgments should, accordingly, be reversed, the determinations annulled, and the matters remitted for new hearings (see
Matter of Batista v Kuhlmann, 90 AD2d 934 ). Having reached this conclusion, we find it unnecessary to reach petitioners’ remaining argument. Judgments reversed, on the law, without costs, determinations annulled, and matters remitted to the Department of Correctional Services for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith. Sweeney, J. P., Kane, Casey, Weiss and Levine, JJ., concur.