Majority
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Crowell, J.), entered May 7, 2013 in Saratoga County, upon remittal, ordering, among other things, defendant to pay certain child support.
Plaintiff (hereinafter the father) and defendant (hereinafter the mother) were married in 1996 and are the parents of twin sons (born in 1996) and a daughter (born in 2004). The father commenced this divorce action in February 2009 seeking, among other things, custody of the children and child support. After a trial, Supreme Court (Brown, J.H.O.) issued a judgment of
Upon remittal and after a hearing, Supreme Court (Crowell, J.) calculated the mother’s presumptive weekly child support obligation to be $258.33, but concluded that it would be “just and appropriate” to reduce it to $30 per week. The court also directed that child support be paid retroactive to the date of the judgment of divorce, excluding a nine-month period when the mother was unemployed and received inpatient treatment for alcohol dependency. Finally, the court denied the father’s request for recoupment of the child support payments he made to the mother pursuant to the judgment of divorce. Upon the father’s appeal, we now modify.
The father challenges Supreme Court’s calculation of the mother’s child support obligation on various grounds. Initially, he argues that the court should have imputed income to the mother based on her 2009 earnings of approximately $70,000 from her employment as an echocardiogram technician at a local hospital. We disagree. The proof showed that the mother was terminated from such employment in June 2011 and that, in March 2012, she obtained a comparable position at a different hospital earning $55,000 annually. While there was some evidence that the mother’s alcohol dependency may have played a role in her termination, the record reflects that the mother’s previous employer gave as the reason for her termination that her position was being eliminated due to the downsizing of her department. She obtained her current position after an employment search within her field, which yielded limited opportunities because her field was “[d]ownsizing.” Under these circumstances, we are of the view that the mother’s 2012 income accurately reflected her earning potential and we discern no abuse of Supreme Court’s considerable discretion in declining to impute income to her based on her pretermination income (see Sadaghiani v Ghayoori, 83 AD3d 1309 , 1312 [2011]; Matter of Disidoro v Disidoro, 81 AD3d 1228 , 1230 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]; Armstrong v Armstrong, 72 AD3d 1409 , 1413 [2010]).
Although we agree with the father that some of the factors considered by Supreme Court did not justify a deviation from the presumptive amount,[3] we concur with the court’s ultimate conclusion that a deviation was appropriate under the circumstances here. Most significantly, as Supreme Court noted, the father’s income is twice that of the mother and such a disparity, alone, can justify a deviation (see Riemersma v Riemersma, 84 AD3d at 1478 ). The father also receives significant tax deductions and credits for the children, whereas the mother receives none (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [¶] [4]). Addition
1 $103,247 for the father plus $50,792.50 for the mother.
2 Neither party challenges Supreme Court’s application of the percentage to the entire combined parental income, including that in excess of the statutory cap (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c] [3]).
3 For example, costs associated with providing suitable housing, food and clothing for the children during custodial periods are not extraordinary expenses that would justify a deviation (see Riemersma v Riemersma, 84 AD3d at 1477 ). In addition, Supreme Court offered no explanation for its conclusion that a deviation was warranted based upon the “emotional support” provided by the mother during her substantial parenting time.
We also agree with the father that the mother’s child support obligation should have been made retroactive to February 9, 2009, the date the father made a specific demand therefor in his complaint (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [7] [a]; Vertucci v Vertucci, 103 AD3d 999 , 1006 [2013]; Ungar v Savett, 84 AD3d 1460 , 1461-1462 [2011]). Nonetheless, contrary to the father’s contention that the calculation of the retroactive amount due should not take into account the mother’s unemployment from June 2011 through March 2012, we are of the view that such calculation should reflect that, during this time, the mother was seeking treatment for alcohol dependency and was searching for new employment, while receiving modest unemployment benefits.[5] Inasmuch as the mother’s income while unemployed placed her close to or below the poverty income guidelines, child support for that period should have been fixed at $25 per month (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [d]). Accordingly, remittal is required for a determination of the appropriate amount of retroactive support.
The father’s further contention that he is entitled to a credit against equitable distribution for the child support he paid to the mother pursuant to the divorce judgment is unavailing. Inasmuch as he could have raised this issue in his prior appeal from the judgment requiring him to pay child support, his failure to do so constitutes a waiver thereof (see e.g. Dimery v Ulster
4 While Supreme Court did not expressly state that the presumptive amount was unjust or inappropriate, the only plausible reading of its decision manifests such a finding.
5 According to her tax returns, she earned a total of approximately $10,000 in unemployment benefits between June 2011 and March 2012.
To the extent not specifically addressed, the parties’ remaining contentions have been considered and found to be without merit.
Peters, PJ., McCarthy and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, without costs, by increasing defendant’s child support obligation to $150 per week, retroactive to February 9, 2009, except for the period of June 2011 through March 2012, during which time defendant’s child support obligation is $25 per month; matter remitted to the Supreme Court for calculation of retroactive arrears; and, as so modified, affirmed.
Cases cited
- Smith v. Smith 97 AD3d 923 p. 1140
- Sadaghiani v. Ghayoori 83 AD3d 1309 at 1312 p. 1140
- Disidoro v. Disidoro 81 AD3d 1228 at 1230 p. 1140
- Armstrong v. Armstrong 72 AD3d 1409 at 1413 p. 1140
- Bast v. Rossoff 91 NY2d 723 at 727 p. 1141
- Cassano v. Cassano 85 NY2d 649 at 654 p. 1141
- Riemersma v. Riemersma 84 AD3d 1474 at 1477 p. 1141
- Kelly v. Kelly 90 AD3d 1295 at 1296-1297 p. 1141
- Vertucci v. Vertucci 103 AD3d 999 at 1006 p. 1142
- Ungar v. Savett 84 AD3d 1460 at 1461-1462 p. 1142
- Dimery v. Ulster Savings Bank 82 AD3d 1034 at 1034 p. 1143
- Jackson v. Walsh 17 NY3d 774 p. 1143
- Goncalves v. Stuyvesant Development Associates 244 AD2d 267 at 268 p. 1143
- Johnson v. Chapin 12 NY3d 461 at 466 p. 1143
- Baraby v. Baraby 250 AD2d 201 at 205 p. 1143
- People ex rel. Breitstein v. Aaronson 3 AD3d 588 at 589 p. 1143