Majority
Headnote
[1] Estates op Deceased Persons—Wills—Testamentary Capacity —Hallucinations—Delusions.—Proof of the existence of hallucinations or delusions is not alone sufficient to annul a will unless such hallucinations or delusions hear directly upon the testamentary act.—On August 29, 1922, Christopher Mc-Donough made his last will and testament and died June 5, 1924, one year and nine months thereafter. At the time of his death he left surviving him his son, Daniel, the contestant herein, aged about forty-four years and a resident of Massachusetts. The other children of the testator, according to the testimony of Daniel, had died without issue prior to the death of the testator. By his will he devised his estate, which at the time his will was executed consisted of a sum of less than eight thousand dollars in bank, except the sum of one hundred dollars, to proponent, Elizabeth Joyce, the wife of Martin Joyce. The contestant by his action herein alleged two grounds of contest: First, undue influence, and, second, unsoundness of mind. A nonsuit was granted as to the first ground and the finding of the jury that the testator was of unsound mind at the time he executed the will was sustained by the trial court, and judgment was accordingly entered thereon annulling and revoking the probate of said will. The appeal is taken from the whole of said judgment.
There seems to be some uncertainty as to the exact age of testator at the time he made his will. It is probable that his age, as declared in the will to be seventy-eight years, was approximately correct.
The testator was a native of Ireland, unable to read or write, and by trade a street-paver. The date of his arrival in this country does not appear from the record, but it does appear that he was a resident of the state of Massachusetts in 1887. At that time his wife was living and he was the father of seven young children, contestant then being seven or eight years of age. It would seem that the home was destroyed by a cause not 'disclosed in the record, the parents
It seems that upon leaving Massachusetts, McDonough resided for a time at Salt Lake City and finally took up his residence in San Francisco in 1894, where he resided until the day of his death, a period of approximately thirty years. His early life was spent in the old world, where rigid economy was a rule of necessity and saving became a fixed habit, which he practiced during the entire earning period of his life.
It is contestant’s contention that prior to going to live with the Joyce family the testator lived in a condition of extreme squalor, which alone was sufficient to create a serious doubt as to his sanity. Much stress is laid upon his method of living covering a period of about three years. The first insight given of his methods of living begins with the year 1901. In that year he became a roomer at a rooming-house conducted by Mrs. Anna McManus, where he remained until forced out by the fire and earthquake of 1906. Mrs. Mc-Manus re-established herself after the fire and the testator returned as a roomer. He remained at her house until 1915, at which time he made a visit to his son, who was residing in Massachusetts. After three months’ absence in the east he returned to San Francisco and again took a room at the McManus home. He remained there until July, 1917, when, against his wish, he was compelled to seek another rooming place, as Mrs. McManus needed the room for her own purposes. He then went to live with Michael Moran in South San Francisco. It is claimed by several witnesses offered by proponent that the “shack,” as the building was described, presented a revolting picture of squalor and filth. Paradoxical as it may appear, several of the witnesses who expressed a pronounced feeling of disgust at the wretched conditions that prevailed at the Moran place nevertheless sought the companionship of McDonough and were very frequent
Contestant produced witnesses who testified that testator was in the habit of picking up copper wire, mechanical bolts, nuts, broken pipes, and broken hairpins and safety-pins, tin cans, and cigar and cigarette stubs which he brought to his room. At times he complained of being dizzy and of seeing specks or spots in the air, and he also was heard to complain of pains in the back of his head and had been heard to say, “I wish I was dead.” He had been kqown to fail to recognize an acquaintance upon meeting him on the street until such person made himself known. His eyes upon a few occasions appeared to be “starey” and sometimes he would “glare.” It is said that at times he had worn copper wire about his wrist as a sort of talisman against aches and pains; that upon certain occasions he had fallen and had to be assisted to his home, and that he had fallen asleep while reclining outdoors and awakened after the rain had started to fall. Mental lapses, repetitions in conversation, loss of sense of location for the moment, and failure to appreciate the passing of time, as well as acts which may or may not be evidence of mental weakness, were testified to by witnesses called by the contestant. Thirty years of the testator’s life were brought into review and the acts culled therefrom which it is claimed
Tested by a long list of decisions of this court the evidence in the instant case must be held to be insufficient as a matter of law to establish testamentary incapacity. Almost every act upon which • contestant relies to establish incompetency has been considered by this court and its evidentiary weakness judicially pointed out. The opinions expressed by said witnesses founded upon facts and conditions described by them are not sufficient to overturn the uncontradicted evidence of the witnesses who testified to testator’s sound mental condition at the very time the will was executed or at times very near thereto. [2] As has been said by this court in many decisions the question to be determined is not what might have been the mental condition of the testator, but what in fact was his mental condition at the time he made the will. (Estate of Perkins, supra; Estate of Relph, 192 Cal. 451 [ 221 Pac. 361 ] ; Estate of Wilson, 117 Cal. 262 [ 49 Pac. 172 , 711].) [3] The law presumes that the subscribing witnesses to the execution of a will had their attention drawn to and noted the mental capacity of the testator. The opinions of such witnesses are entitled to more weight than that of one who is merely passive. (Estate of Holloway, 195 Cal. 711 [ 235 Pac. 1012 ].) Besides the subscribing witnesses there was also present the pastor and spiritual adviser of testator. No one attempted to question the honesty or standing of said witnesses and no impeachment of their testimony was attempted. Paraphrasing the language in Estate of Carson, 74 Cal. App. 48 [ 239 Pac. 364 ], it may be said here, as it was said with respect to the testator in that case, that McDonough was able to and did keep in mind all things necessary to qualify him to make a will and was, as shown by the only evidence given as to his mental condition at the very time the will was made, free and able to act in its execution. A résumé of the testimony of those present at the time the will was made and as to which there is no direct contradiction, if indeed there can be said to be any evidence to show mental incompetency, follows:
Denis O’Shea, a neighborhood merchant, was one of the witnesses to the execution of the will. He first became acquainted with the testator in 1919 and knew him intimately from the time he came to live with the Joyce family until his death, June 5, 1924. He had many conversations with him on various topics and had ample opportunity to observe him. There was nothing peculiar or unusual in his conversation or conduct at any of the times he met him and he appeared at all times to be perfectly sane. He used a stick or cane when walking and said that he had bad feet and could not trust himself on the hillsides. The Joyce home was in a hilly section of the city. He did not appear feeble or infirm, but was quite strong for a man of his age. The witness detailed a conversation he had with the testator on the increase of the cost of living above the ruling market prices of former years in which he gave concrete illustrations of the shrinkage in the purchasing value of money within Ms experience which would clearly indicate that he was well oriented as to the subject of the conversation. Other subjects were discussed and no diseased mental condition or mental fault was observed in the testator at any of the times the witness was thrown into contact with him. The witness was called to the Joyce home on August 29th by Mrs. Joyce to witness the testator’s will. When he arrived the only persons he saw in the house were Father Galvin, Mr. Joyce and Mr. McDonough. Mr. Savage and Mrs. Joyce came afterward. The attorney excluded everyone from Mr. McDonough’s room, closed the door, and spent some time with Mr. McDonough without the hearing or presence of any other person. Mr. Savage finally came out of the room and proceeded to write the will. Upon completing it he called the witness and Reverend Galvin into the room, where Mr. McDonough was sitting in a chair, and closed the door. Neither Mr.
Theodore J. Savage, an attorney who has practiced his profession for thirty years in San Francisco, testified that he drew the will under the instructions of the testator. A day or two before the will was drawn Mrs. Joyce, who was a total stranger to him, came to his office and stated that an old gentleman stopping at her house wished to make his will. She brought with her a card from Dr. George T. Brady, an acquaintance and an occasional client of the attorney. The attorney told Mrs. Joyce that he would be at the house either on the next or second day at a fixed hour and instructed her to have present two persons who were acquainted with Mr. McDonough to serve as witnesses to the execution of the will. Upon his arrival he found Father Galvin and Mr. O’Shea there. He was introduced to McDonough, who was fully dressed and seated in a chair. He talked with him at considerable length and, after taking his instructions in detail, went into the dining-room, from which all persons withdrew at his request, and he there drew the will which is assailed by contestant. He read the will aloud to the testator in the hearing of those present and discussed some of its provisions with him. The testator said he could neither read nor write and requested that the will be read a second time. He asked the attorney to write his name at the place where he was to affix his mark, declared the instrument to be his will, made his mark, and requested the attorney and Mr. O’Shea to sign as witnesses to its execution. The attorney testified that in his opinion the testator was perfectly sane in mind at the time he made his will, his reasons therefor being founded upon the conversation held with him for the purpose of obtaining necessary information to prepare the will. He asked the testator many questions which tested in a large degree his testamentary capacity. The testator stated that he was born in Ireland, and was seventy-eight years of age, and he talked generally about the different places he had visited in this country. He said the only property he owned was about eight thousand dollars deposited
Dr. Thomas II. 0 ’Connor was called to attend the testator during the latter days of August, 1922, close to the day on which the will was executed. The testator was at that time suffering from an eczemic condition in his lower limbs. He was able to walk about and there was nothing to indicate feebleness in his condition. His body was neither emaciated nor poorly nourished. The physician was of the opinion that the testator was of sound mind. Six months thereafter the physician was again called to attend him on account of
Mr. and Mrs. Joyce both testified at length as to the circumstances under which McDonough came to live in their family. Mr. Joyce had known McDonough for many years prior to his marriage and the latter visited at the family home after said marriage. Mrs. Joyce was exceptionally kind to him during all the time he was at her home and cared for him tenderly during his last illness, which was somewhat protracted. McDonough was greatly pleased with the care and treatment he was receiving and expressed gratitude for the comforts of real home life. Both testified as to his competency.
Two medical witnesses were called in the ease, one by the contestant and the other by the proponent. In response to a hypothetical question embracing substantially the same assumed statement of facts, one was of the opinion that the testator was of unsound mind and the other was of the opinion that he was mentally sound.
The fact that McDonough, beginning some time after he made his will, paid one hundred dollars monthly for the board, lodging, and care which he received is not pertinent
Contestant has quoted at considerable length from Dunphy v. Dunphy, 161 Cal. 380 [Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1230, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 818 , 119 Pac. 512 ]. That case considered the question as to the degree of unsoundness of mind that must be proved to authorize a judgment annulling a marriage contract. We are not here considering the mental capacity requisite to make a valid marriage contract, which presupposes an understanding on the part of the contracting parties of the duties, obligations, and responsibilities of the marital state. Here we are considering merely the ability of the testator to make a simple will. The capacity requisite to do has been repeatedly defined by decisions of this court and it is not necessary to cite specific eases. [5] In considering the question of a testator’s competency the rule by which the evidence must be measured is thus stated: “ . . . the issue does not rest upon the contestant’s evidence alone. The testimony of proponent’s witnesses must be taken into consideration in weighing the sufficiency of the contestant’s case. Evidence which standing by itself might be sufficient to sustain a verdict may in the light of all the facts be wholly inadequate, and that without invading the province of the jury as the judges of the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.” (Estate of Casarotti, 184 Cal. 73 [ 192 Pac. 1085 ].)
[6] Measured by the law of this state the evidence must be held to be insufficient to sustain the judgment.
The judgment is reversed.
Eiehards, J., Shenk, J., Waste, C. J., Curtis, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- Shay v. Shay 196 Cal. 355 p. 62
- Presho v. Presho 196 Cal. 639 p. 62
- Hewitt v. Cutten 199 Cal. 119 p. 62
- Fink v. Bigelow 195 Cal. 699 p. 62
- In re Estate of Purcell 164 Cal. 300 p. 62
- In re Estate of Relph 192 Cal. 451 p. 62
- Wilson v. McConnachie 117 Cal. 262 p. 62
- Parker v. Bryson 195 Cal. 711 p. 62
- In re Estate of Carson 74 Cal. App. 48 p. 62
- Dunphy v. Dunphy 161 Cal. 380 p. 69
- Casarotti v. Lyons 184 Cal. 73 p. 69