p. 164Buss, Wood & Co. would not let him have a check for more than five hundred dollars, and for that reason he bought the second check of Hitchcock, Shaw & Co. He admitted that the plaintiff wanted good drafts, and said Buss, Wood & Co. would suit him. He testified that he arranged with Shaw to pay him for the draft on Hitchcock, Shaw & Co., if the draft should prove satisfactory to Brown; and that he left the drafts with the clerk, and told him that if the drafts suited Brown, to send him his note. That a few days after, he received his note with the indorsement thereon, and that then he paid Shaw three hundred and seventy-five dollars on the draft.
The first instruction to the jury asked by the plaintiff’s counsel, was as follows:
“If plaintiff received the draft on Hitchcock, Shaw & Co., and forwarded it with due diligence for collection, and upon due presentation to the drawees it was not paid, and reasonable notice of its non-payment was given to the defendant, then you will find for the plaintiff, unless you further find that plaintiff expressly agreed to accept said draft to the amount thereof in satisfaction and discharge of the note in suit.”
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed from the judgment and from an order denying a new trial.
Buck & Stafford, for the Appellant.
Where the facts are ascertained due diligence is a question of law; and in this case plaintiff was bound by law to forward the check by mail on the same or the succeeding day after he received it for presentment and payment.The first instruction given at the plaintiff’s request is erroneous. It tells the jury to find for plaintiff unless they find that plaintiff expressly agreed to accept said draft to
p. 165the amount thereof in satisfaction and discharge of the note.Now, first: It is well settled that an agreement of that kind need not be expressed in words, but may be inferred from circumstances. (Gibson v. Tobey, 46 N. Y. 637 .)The jury were thus misled into the belief that the agreement to take the draft in payment must have been expressed in words or it was not binding, and are nowhere informed that an express agreement may be presumed from the conduct of the parties.McElrath & Osment, for the Respondent.
Sight bills or notes payable on demand are to be presented only within a reasonable time. (Aymer v. Beers, 7 Cowen, 709; Field v. Nickerson, 13 Mass. 135 ; Story on Bills, Sec. 231; Edwards’s Bills and Notes, 389, 391.)Seven days have been held a reasonable time. (Seaver v. Lincoln, 21 Pick. 267 .) And five months unreasonable. (1 Cowen, 397.) In Robinson v. Ames ( 20 John. 146 ), a delay of over two months was held not unreasonable.Accepting a draft for a debt due is no payment unless specially so agreed. (Welch v. Allington, 23 Cal. 322 ; Griffith v. Grogan, 12 Cal. 217 ; Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pet. —; Sheehy v. Mandeville, 6 Cranch, 253 .)1. The question whether the draft upon Hitchcock, Shaw & Co. was received by the plaintiff in payment of his note, was submitted to the jury upon substantially conflicting evidence, and will not, therefore, be examined into here.
2. We think the evidence sufficiently shows all the diligence in the presentation of the draft for payment that could be reasonably required under the circumstances of the case.
3. There was no error in giving the first instruction asked by the plaintiff. The decisions of the different States are not uniform upon the question presented by this instruction. But this Court has repeatedly recognized the rule that an express agreement must be shown to establish the fact that a bill or note of either the debtor or a third person
p. 166was taken by the creditor in payment of a pre-existing debt.
(Griffith v.
Grogan, 12 Cal. 320 ;
Welch v.
Allington, 23 Cal. 322 ;
Brewster v.
Bours, 8 Cal. 506 .)
We think it unnecessary to discuss other points made by the appellant. We find no error in the record.
Judgment and order affirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Wallace did not express an opinion.