People v. Day

From a judgment of conviction of the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and from an order by which her motion for a new trial was denied, defendant appeals to this court.

Although appellant's brief on appeal contains several different specifications of error, upon each of which she relies for a reversal of the judgment, it is deemed necessary that hut one of such assignments of error should occupy the attention of this court. It relates to the admissibility on the trial of the action of the alleged confession of defendant.

With reference only to the question submitted to the trial court which related to the admissibility of such confession, it appears that on the part of defendant many facts were admitted in evidence which tended to show that the alleged confession of defendant was not made either freely or voluntarily, or without hope, of immunity being extended to defendant, either by the district attorney or by the trial court. But as to such facts as were contradicted by evidence submitted by the People, in the decision herein none of them should he,. nor is, taken into consideration by this court. However, the record herein discloses the following undisputed facts: At the home of defendant, in the nighttime, or “late in the evening”, on February 25, 1931, without a warrant of arrest, but by means of showing their “credentials”, which consisted of a “badge” worn by each

Relative to the question of whether the confession by defendant was made freely and voluntarily, a part of the testimony given by defendant, which in no way was contradicted by any witness, included the following: “ ... I couldn’t even, without permission, I couldn’t go any place that I wanted to. I had my car in Long Beach, and I was forbidden to go for my car. ... I was never alone; I was always with Miss Fairchild or Miss Six. . . . They finally let me ’phone the place where I worked, so I could tell them why I wasn’t showing up to work. . . . She (one of the guards) said the district attorney’s office was paying them (the hotel bills); and they would take care of me for six months, if necessary, until they got through with me as a

It also appears from uncontradicted testimony given by defendant that besides the two guards, on one evening after defendant was taken to the hotel, for a considerable length of time four other persons were in the room where defendant was kept in custody, one of whom was also an “investigator” and two of the others were persons who likewise were either under arrest or who theretofore had been charged with a criminal offense in some manner connected with the particular offense of which defendant later was convicted. The defendant also testified that at no time before she made her statement or confession was she informed that any statement made by her would be used against her; that she was “very nervous and upset, and particularly worried about this fed

In the cases of People v. Loper, 159 Cal. 6 [Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1193, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 934 , 112 Pac. 720 ] ; People v. Borello, 161 Cal. 367 [ 137 L. R. A. (N. S.) 434 , 119 Pac. 500 ]; People v. Clark, 55 Cal. App. 42 [ 203 Pac. 781 ]; People v. Quan Gim Gow, 23 Cal. App. 507 [ 138 Pac. 918 ]; and Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 [ 42 L. Ed. 568 , 578, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 183 ], many former adjudicated eases are reviewed and the law is restated which relates generally to the admissibility of confessions of a defendant in a criminal action, and particularly with reference to situations which are analogous to that portrayed by the facts hereinbefore set forth. In principle, the authorities are in complete harmony one with the other that in circumstances describing a situation even less powerful in its probable effect upon the' free will of a defendant than appears prevailed in the instant case, the confession of guilt by a defendant should never be admitted in evidence. The research of industrious counsel for the People has failed to disclose any authority which would indicate that a rule to the contrary has ever obtained within either the jurisdiction of this state or of any other state in the Union. The case of People v. Dye, 119 Cal. App. 262 [ 6 Pac. (2d) 313 ], contains the latest expression of opinion on the subject either by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal of this state. Therein may be found a fairly complete resu/mé of legal principles, accompanied by judicial precedent, which pertain to a proper discussion of such questions as may be here involved; and it is deemed unnecessary to herein restate such principles. It is enough to assert that by all authority a confession of a defendant obtained as was shown even by the uncontradicted and undisputed evidence hereinbefore set forth is inadmissible in evidence.

Concerning the probable effect which the confession of guilt of defendant had upon the verdict of the jury, it is to be noted that on the part of the prosecution, aside from the testimony of the complaining witness, who was of the age of seventeen years and whose alleged delinquency formed the foundation of the complaint against defendant, no supporting evidence of any kind or character, other than the

Considering the recognized possibility of inaccuracy, or falsehood in testimony relating to offenses of the character of that of which defendant was charged, in connection with the facts hereinbefore set forth which immediately preceded the date when the prosecuting witness' gave her testimony, with the consequent inherent doubt regarding the truth of such testimony, it cannot be said that the confession of guilt by defendant of her criminal participation in the alleged delinquency of the prosecuting witness did not influence the jury in the rendition of its verdict; and since it appears that on the trial of the action, by permitting the jury to consider in evidence the confession of defendant, she was prejudiced in her substantial rights in the premises, it follows that the judgment and the order by which her motion for a new trial was denied should be reversed. It is so ordered.

Conrey, P. J., and York, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on August 9, 1932, and an application by respondent to have the cause heard in the