People v. Coakley

Appellants were jointly aceussed on two counts of having received stolen property. Paul Coakley having been convicted of both charges appeals from the judg

At the time of the crimes, December, 1950, appellants resided in illicit relationship in San Pedro and were planning to enter their new home in Compton. They were both narcotic addicts and sold to others. Two of their fellow narcotists were Vincent and Imogene Beyes. On a day in July, 1950, Coakley in the presence of Goldie told Vincent of his buying a new home and of his desire that Vincent assist him to furnish it with household appliances. Vincent agreed that he could obtain the requisite articles by stealing them. Coakley approved of the plan and promised to trade Vincent capsules of heroin for such merchandise as he might deliver. Goldie asked Vincent to get her a mixmaster, and iron and other household articles. In late July, 1950, Imogene told Goldie the deal of Paul and Vincent was very good and at the same time paid Goldie $8.00 for two capsules of heroin. She accompanied her husband on several occasions when he called to purchase heroin from Coakley. She obtained money from various persons for “certain services.” After his arrest, Coakley told Officer Howsley that he had handled narcotics until two weeks prior to his disclosures of his erstwhile vocation.

Facts of Count I

The witness Aparici was a friend of and resided near, the Reyes couple. He was a worker in a sardine cannery. When he left his apartment at 4 a. m. of November 4, 1950, he left his typewriter in place. Soon after his departure, Vincent Reyes broke off the screen, burglariously entered through the bathroom window and removed the Corona machine. He took it to Coakley to whom “everybody took all their hot stuff to purchase heroin.”

Facts of Count II

November 5, 1950, Earl Eaton operated a service station in Wilmington about three miles from the Reyes home. He owned and kept there a mixmaster and bowls, and other

In the ordinary case of a thief’s selling his loot no claim could be successfully asserted that the vendor is an accomplice of the purchaser. (In re Morton, 179 Cal. 510 , 513 [ 177 P. 453 ]; People v. Burness, 53 Cal.App.2d 214 , 219 [ 127 P.2d 623 ].) But in the instant action the thieves were actual accomplices of the appellants. This is established by the evidence of their entering into a conspiracy for themselves to steal and for Coakley to receive the stolen goods. By virtue of such conspiracy they became liable for the identical of

While it was error to refuse the instructions, how couM appellants have been prejudiced % There was abundant corroboration aside from the Reyes’ testimony to connect appellants with the crime charged. The articles stolen from the home and the service station were found in appellants’ apartment. Access to the typewriter was made difficult by their placing it in the attic. No consent was given by either victim to the removal of the items taken. Neither appellant denied they had possession of the stolen property. Possession was itself sufficient corroboration. (People v. Rice, 29 Cal. App.2d 614 , 620 [ 85 P.2d 215 ].) It is not required that corroborating evidence itself go so far as to establish guilt without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice. (People v. Miller, 54 Cal.App.2d 384 , 386 [ 128 P.2d 785 ].) In addition to the possession of the stolen articles and the confession of appellants, they are now confronted by the falsehoods they told the officers in their efforts to exculpate themselves, and Goldie’s subsequent refusal to answer questions of the officers. Such contradictions by one accused, or his silence or his lies are independent corroborative evidence. (People v. Willmurth, 77 Cal.App.2d 605 , 612 [ 176 P.2d 102 ] ; People v. Sandelin, 105 Cal.App.2d 179 [ 233 P.2d 147 ] ; People v. West, 4 Cal.2d 267 , 371 [ 49 P.2d 276 ].)

In view of such strong corroboration it is a reasonable deduction that the refusal of the court to give the requested instructions was not prejudicial. No presumption of prejudice arises from error. Before an error may suffice to require a reversal, it must be shown that the accused was substantially injured by the error. (People v. Lawlor, 21 Cal.App. 63 , 71 [ 131 P. 63 ] ; People v. Thompson, 68 Cal. App. 487 , 493 [ 229 P. 896 ] ; People v. McEvers, 53 Cal.App. 2d 448 , 453 [ 128 P.2d 93 ].) Where the testimony of an accomplice is disregarded and the remaining evidence is inculpatory and tends to connect the defendant with the offense charged, then the accomplice is corroborated. (People v. White, 35 Cal.App.2d 61 , 94 [ 94 P.2d 617 ]; People v. Morton, 139 Cal. 719 , 724 [ 73 P. 609 ].) But his testimony “is required to give to the ‘corroboration’ direction to the alleged crime, before such corroborative testimony can be said to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime.” (People v, Saroaya, 46 Cal.App.2d 466 , 470 [ 115 P.2d 1001 ].)

Finally, appellants were both morphine addicts and Coakley had been a heroin dealer prior to his transaction with Reyes. He had evidently accumulated no household appliances. He desired them for his prospective home. Add these facts to the fact of his possession of the stolen goods and his admission that he figured Vincent had “heisted” the typewriter because he was not “a member of the intelligentsia” and the corroboration is abundant'.

Golden Adams was no innocent babe. She was living with Coakley and was a friend of Vincent and Imogene. While she at first denied knowledge of the thieving of the couple, she made no protest when, in her presence, Vincent told the officer of having sold her a “regular iron” for two capsules, the usual price “Paul has been giving me.”

With such proof adopted by both court and jury, could there be a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of appellants? If they are guilty, it would be preposterous to discharge them or to remand the case for a new trial because of the court’s “error as to a matter of procedure” or of its “misdirection of the jury.” (Const., art. VI, § 4%.) The adoption of that section must have and hold its significance in the corpus juris of California. It spelled the end of meaningless reversals and of maintaining courts for the amusement of professional criminals.

The Verdicts

Miss Adams contends that the verdict of guilty on Count I vitiated the verdict of not guilty on Count II. She argues that the evidence against her shows only one conspiracy by means of which the Reyes couple were to obtain specific personal property for appellants, citing Oliver v. Superior Court, 92 Cal.App. 94 [ 267 P. 764 ] ; In re Johnston, 3 Cal.2d 32 [ 43 P.2d 541 ]; People v. Bales, 74 Cal.App.2d 732 , 734 [ 169 P.2d 262 ]. Such contention is contrary to the clear letter of section 954 of the Penal Code, to wit, “a verdict of acquittal of one or more counts shall not be deemed or held to be an acquittal of any other count.” Bach count in a pleading charges a separate and distinct offense and stands upon its own merits. If one falls its failure does not affect

Accusatory Statement

Miss Adams claims prejudicial error in the court’s allowing Officer Mascillo to testify to her refusal to answer when he said, “You knew that these articles were stolen when Paul bought them.” She contends that her reply was not an admission of guilt, citing People v. Simmons, 28 Cal.2d 699 , 712 [ 172 P.2d 18 ]. The cited decision is adverse to the contention. It holds that an accusatory statement properly becomes a part of the record when the accused responds with an evasive reply.

The appeal of defendant Adams from the judgment is dismissed; the judgment against Coakley and the order denying both motions for a new trial are affirmed. •

McComb, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied December 26, 1951.