People v. Littlejohn

Defendant was convicted by a jury on one count of an information charging violation of section 11500 of

Defendant’s appeal is predicated primarily on the contention that the trial court erroneously, over timely objections, admitted evidence which was unlawfully obtained without a search warrant and was prejudicial to this defendant.

Defendant and appellant was living at a house in Fresno with his sister Lydia Ruiz and one Ernest Johnson. Two members of the narcotics squad previously learned of an all-points bulletin in reference to the theft from San Francisco of a green Mercury Montclair coupé with a certain Washington State license number, and that one Janet Jones was a suspect and had been charged with stealing it. This car had been previously seen by the officers around Fresno being driven by defendant and also by one Dolores Villarreal. The officers received word from Tacoma, Washington, that the car was registered to one Yippee- Fung of Seattle, who had moved to San Francisco. One officer testified that other officers working the Chinatown beat, called him on two or three occasions and told him they had information that defendant was peddling narcotics from the vehicle and that he had questioned defendant one night at a drive-in while seated in the car with one Dolores Villarreal, whom he took to be Janet Jones; and that defendant then told him the car belonged to Janet Jones. Upon this information and the fact defendant and Lydia were registered as cotenants at this house, these officers arranged a stake-out in a nearby warehouse and watched the operations of defendant and the occupants of the house over a period of several days. On the evening of April 7th, at about 10 o’clock this car drove up and was parked in a carport. Two women, Dolores and Lydia, stepped out. When just inside the screen-door, the officers approached, exhibited their badges and told them they were under arrest on suspicion of car theft. They had neither a warrant of arrest nor search warrant. There is some conflict as to whether the screen-door had been closed when the officers walked in. However, if it was closed the officers opened it and stepped inside. Defendant, Johnson and one Helen Gonzales were there seated in the living room. Defendant was questioned about the car and he said it belonged to Janet Jones, a friend of his in San Francisco, that she

Defendant produced several witnesses in an endeavor to impeach the testimony of Dolores. She had just been committed to the Youth Authority as a user of heroin growing

The evidence, if admissible against defendant, was sufficient to support all the charges, and the testimony of the complaining witness Dolores Villarreal, although contradicted in some respects, was not inherently improbable. (People v. De Paula, 43 Cal.2d 643 , 649 [ 276 P.2d 600 ].) The principal question is whether it was illegally obtained under the authorities relied upon by defendant, such as People v. Cohan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [ 282 P.2d 905 ]; People v. Wilson, 145 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 301 P.2d 974 ]; People v. Kitchens, 46 Cal.2d 260 [ 294 P.2d 17 ] ; People v. Thymiakas, 140 Cal.App.2d 940 [ 296 P.2d 4 ] ; People v. Schraier, 141 Cal.App.2d 600 [ 297 P.2d 81 ]; People v. Gale, 46 Cal.2d 253 [ 294 P.2d 13 ]; and People v. Molarius, 146 Cal.App.2d 129 [ 303 P.2d 350 ],

There can be no question that there was reasonable cause for the arrest of Dolores Villarreal and Lydia Ruiz for violation of section 503 of the Vehicle Code. The officers had previous reliable information that the car they were driving was stolen, and they were found driving it. It appears that defendant was also previously seen driving it at a time when it had been reported as being stolen; that several officers, walking the beat in Chinatown, had suspicioned defendant of using it for the purpose of effecting the sale of narcotics, and these facts were known to the officers making the entry into the house at the time of the arrest. They had knowledge that a felony had been committed and it was reasonable to believe that the two women, seen driving the stolen ear, were guilty of the felony. (Veh. Code, § 503; People v. Ragone, 84 Cal.App.2d 476 [ 191 P.2d 126 ] ; People v. West, 144 Cal.App.2d 214 [ 300 P.2d 729 ]; Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 5.) They were informed of their arrest and the screen-door was opened for the purpose of making this arrest. There was a sufficient compliance with section 844 of the Penal Code. (People v. Borbon, 146 Cal.App.2d 315 [ 303 P.2d 560 ] ; People v. Maddox, 46 Cal.2d 301 , 305 [ 294 P.2d 6 ].) In the latter case it was held that the primary purpose of the constitutional guarantees relating to searches and seizures is to prevent unreasonable invasions of the security of the people in their persons, houses, papers and effects, and when an officer has reasonable cause to enter a dwelling to make

It was recently held that under such circumstances as here related, the officers could only make that kind of a search reasonably necessary in connection with their right of entry, but in the course of conducting a reasonable search they did not have to blind themselves to what was in plain sight simply because it was disconnected with the purpose for which they entered. (People v. Roberts, 47 Cal.2d 374 [ 303 P.2d 721 ].) In that case the officers, while rightfully in the room on another mission, saw a stolen radio which was in plain sight and they took the number of it. Several cases are cited as authority for this holding. In one of these cases the officers entered the defendant’s house lawfully for the purpose of searching for another man, and in the course of the search they discovered a distillery in operation. In another, the officers entered lawfully for the purpose of finding and arresting the defendant on one charge and in searching for the defendant they discovered an illegal supply of liquor in the basement, another and different offense. In another case there cited, it was said that where the entry and search are rightful and there is present no element of trespass or fraudulent invasion of the rights of the citizens, there is no reason for excluding evidence of crime discovered in the course of the search; that if the officers discovered in the cellar a counterfeiting plant in operation would it have been their duty to ignore it ? If they had come upon the body of a murdered man would their testimony as to finding the body be excluded?

In formulating the rule governing lawful searches and seizures, it quoted from authorities of the United States Supreme Court recognizing the distinction between the seizure of evidence which was readily visible and accessible to the officers and that which was uncovered only after a general, unreasonable ransacking of the premises, and stated that the decisions also make a sharp distinction between the seizure of property which is stolen or contraband and property which is unoffend

Where the entry and search are rightful and there is present no element of trespass or fraudulent invasion of the rights of citizens, there is no reason for excluding evidence of crime discovered in the course of the search. (Paper v. United States, 53 F.2d 184 , cited with approval in People v. Roberts, supra.) The authorities relied upon by defendant are factually dissimilar. The question as to whether the testimony of the complaining witness was. inherently improbable was considered by the trial court on a motion for new trial and the motion was denied. The reviewing court may not reappraise the credibility of witnesses and reweigh the evidence. (People v. Jones, 36 Cal.2d 373 [ 224 P.2d 353 ].) No prejudicial error appears from the ruling.

Judgment and order affirmed.

Barnard, P. J., and Mussell, J., concurred.