Majority
Appeal is taken from a judgment of conviction of possession of marijuana.
The People’s case, based upon the testimony of Officer
At the trial, defendant testified he had a few drinks that evening. He did not recall the police car behind him immediately prior to the intersection, but admitted that just before he turned on Dunsmuir he saw it and the red light 40 feet behind and knew he was being pursued but did not stop because he was afraid of being arrested for drinking. He denied having zig zag cigarette papers and marijuana in his car at the time, and did not “recall” throwing anything out of his ear.
Appellant claims there is in the record no evidence of knowledge of the narcotic character of the marijuana, relying upon People v. Redrick, 55 Cal.2d 282 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 823 , 359 P.2d
It has long been the rule, as set forth in People v. Redrick, 55 Cal.2d 282 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 823 , 359 P.2d 255 ], “that to establish unlawful possession of narcotics it must be shown that the accused exercised dominion and control over the drug with knowledge of its presence and the narcotic character.’’ (P. 285.) (People v. Winston, 46 Cal.2d 151 [ 293 P.2d 40 ] ; People v. Gorg, 45 Cal.2d 776 [ 291 P.2d 469 ] ; People v. Gorg, 28 Cal.2d 450 [ 170 P.2d 433 ].) In discussing the circumstances permitting the inference that defendant manifested consciousness of guilt of the presence of the narcotic, the court in the Bedrick case, supra, relied on the rule on appeal that “The credence and ultimate weight to be given the evidence of the various particular circumstances are of course for the trier of fact, and ‘It is the trier of fact, not the appellate court, that must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .’ (People v. Robillard (1960), ante, [55 Cal.2d] pp. 88, 93 [1, 2] [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 167 , 358 P.2d 295 ].)” (P.289.) Thus, in the case at bar, giving the circumstances surrounding the pursuit and apprehension of defendant all the legal effect toward guilt to which they are entitled, the evidence more than justifies the trial court’s implied finding that defendant had the marijuana in his possession in the automobile, knew of its illegal character and attempted to dispose of it before being apprehended by police.
At the outset, it is obvious that the trial court, in the exercise of its duty to determine the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence and resolve any factual conflicts, accepted the testimony of the police officer and rejected the defendant’s denial that he threw anything from his automobile or had the narcotic in his possession in the car. That it was the defendant who threw the package containing the marijuana from the moving vehicle is clearly shown from the testimony of Officer Kennedy who saw two objects—the newspaper-wrapped package containing the narcotic, and the package of wheat cigarette papers—thrown from the driver’s side of the vehicle and land in the middle of the street, observed the window on the driver’s side of the car to be half way down and defendant, the driver, to be alone in the automobile, and saw no other vehicle in the street at the time. That defendant knew the criminal nature of the contents of the newspaper-wrapped package is equally clear from the circumstances under which
Appellant can take little comfort from People v. Foster, 115 Cal.App.2d 866 [ 253 P.2d 50 ], and People v. Bledsoe, 75 Cal.App.2d 862 [ 171 P.2d 950 ], In the Foster case, supra, officers pursued an automobile in which three persons were riding in the front seat; defendant was seated on the extreme right; and one of the officers saw a small object containing a narcotic outfit and one and one-half grains of heroin come from the right front window and fall to the street. The court held that the record did not show sufficient facts to justify the finding that either the defendant or the man in the middle, or both, were guilty; however, it directly stated that it was perfectly clear that one, if not more, of the three was guilty of possession of heroin (p. 867). The question was, who among the three threw the article from the window. In the case at bar no such query could arise because defendant was alone in the automobile and if, as the trial court believed, the package came from the vehicle, it must have come from the defendant. Nor do the facts in People v. Bledsoe, 75 Cal.App.2d 862 [ 171 P.2d 950 ], bear semblance to the case before us. There marijuana was found stuffed behind a seat cushion in defendant’s car after it had been stolen and used in a robbery. The court refused to uphold the conviction of possession because there was insufficient evidence of knowledge of the presence of the narcotic.
Although defendant herein testified he had no marijuana in his ear and did not “recall” throwing anything out of the automobile, we cannot say upon the record before us, which discloses a police pursuit, defendant to be the sole occupant of the vehicle and the window on his side partially open, that the trial judge was not justified in drawing the inference that defendant had the marijuana in his possession with knowledge of its unlawful character and threw it out of the ear to rid himself of the incriminating evidence.
Por the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed.
Wood, P. J., and Pourt, J., concurred.
Cases cited
- People v. Redrick 55 Cal.2d 282 p. 601, p. 602
- People v. Foster 115 Cal.App.2d 866 p. 602, p. 603
- People v. Bledsoe 75 Cal.App.2d 862 p. 602, p. 603
- People v. Winston 46 Cal.2d 151 p. 602
- People v. Gorg 45 Cal.2d 776 p. 602
- People v. Gory 28 Cal.2d 450 p. 602
- People v. Berti 178 Cal.App.2d 872 p. 604
- People v. Simmons 118 Cal.App.2d 238 p. 604