Maxwell v. Maxwell

The plaintiff sued to recover from defendant the proceeds of certain insurance policies paid to defendant upon the death of Thomas Maxwell. Defendant had a judgment from which the appeal is taken.

The plaintiff and deceased were married in Seattle, Washington, in August, 1919. In April, 1920, and March, 1926, respectively, two policies of insurance were issued upon the life of deceased in both of which plaintiff was named beneficiary. In October, 1928, plaintiff and deceased were separated, the latter moving to San Francisco where he resided

The burden of appellant’s appeal rests upon the soundness of previous decisions of our Supreme and appellate courts holding that a prior judgment determining the rights of parties to specific property is a bar to subsequent litigation putting in issue the same claims to the same property. The leading ease relied on b)r respondent is Brown v. Brown, 170 Cal. 8 [ 147 P. 1171 .] That case involved the identical question of the effect of a divorce decree settling the property rights in a policy of life insurance. It followed the case between the same parties relating to interests in real property and reported at page 1 of the same volume. In that case the complaint in the divorce action alleged that there was no community property. The defendant defaulted and the court found that all the allegations of the complaint were true. The proceeds of the policy were paid to the estate and, in the cited case, the trial court found that the premiums due upon the policy were all paid from the community funds. But in reversing the judgment the Supreme Court held that the status of the propérty was conclusively determined in the divorce proceeding where it was adjudged that “there was no community property.” The opinion reads (p. 9) : “The only difference between this case and the other case above mentioned, is that here the property is personal property while there it was real estate, and here it consists of an insurance policy which had become the property of Brown before the action for divorce was begun.

In the first case of Brown v. Brown, in discussing the procedural situation, which is identical with what we have here, the court said (p. 5) : “Where a defendant is served with a summons and complaint stating the facts upon which he is required to act, and he makes default, he is presumed to admit all the facts which are well pleaded in the complaint. The judgment which follows upon this sort of admission is, in contemplation of law, a complete adjudication of all the rights of the parties embraced in the prayer for relief and arising from the facts stated in the complaint, including the facts in his favor as well as those against him. The defendant here is presumed to have acceded to the proposition embraced in the complaint and to have consented that plaintiff should obtain the relief therein prayed for, upon the conditions and facts set forth in the complaint. The proceeding is equivalent to a statement by Brown to plaintiff that he did not object to a divorce for the cause alleged, based upon the theory that there was no community property existing at the time the action was begun. When judgment is rendered upon such a complaint and default, it becomes, in effect, a contract between the parties that the judgment shall be final with respect to everything properly embraced within the allegations of the complaint and in the prayer for relief. ’ ’

In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Welch, 202 Cal. 312 [ 260 P. 545 ], the plaintiff wife in a divorce proceeding asked for an assignment to her of certain described community property. No reference was made in the complaint to a policy of life insurance. Nevertheless the court in the decree of divorce awarded her “all of the community property of plaintiff and defendant.” In a suit upon the policy the Supreme Court, on the authority of Brown v. Brown, supra, held that the decree was void insofar as it related to the insurance policy. It is there said (p. 317): “While the decree is silent as to any

The rule is approved in Paduveris v. Paris, 213 Cal. 169 , 172 [ 1 P.2d 986 ]; Allen v. McCrary, 220 Cal. 508 , 510 [ 31 P.2d 388 ] ; Callnon v. Callnon, 7 Cal.App.2d 676 , 679 [ 46 P.2d 988 ] ; Lindley v. Hinch, 57 Cal.App.2d 717 , 719 [ 135 P.2d 421 ] ; Green v. Green, ante, pp. 50, 59 [ 151 P.2d 679 ] ; 85 A.L.R. pp. 347 et seq. Hence the legal effect of the judgment in the divorce case is that it is a conclusive determination that the insurance policies are not part of the community property of appellant and deceased and that the former is estopped from now litigating that issue. This is called the doctrine of collateral estoppel. (Restatement of the Law, Judgments, § 68.)

Appellant states that the only other issue involved is “Whether the court could presume and find that only those premium payments made out of plaintiff’s earnings were made from the community funds of plaintiff and the insured. ’ ’

As we have heretofore stated the decree in the divorce action conclusively determines that, at the time the complaint was filed in 1931 the appellant herein had no interest in the insurance. The record in the divorce action discloses that appellant deserted her husband in 1928. Her testimony that prior to the desertion she had paid some few premiums from community funds goes no further than the year 1928. If any community property had been acquired by the husband after the filing of the complaint in the divorce action, or after the entry of the interlocutory decree the burden was on appellant to prove it. Proof that some payments of premiums had been made from community funds prior to the separation does not meet this burden. To the contrary, proof of the separation in 1928, one thereafter living in Seattle, Washington, the other living in San Francisco, California, taken with the “contract” of the parties found in the pleadings in the divorce action that there was no community property at that

The judgment is affirmed.

Sturtevant, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

Appellant's petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied December 28, 1944.