Majority
Opinion
This action for personal injuries arose out of an automobile accident. Grace Ramirez (plaintiff) was a passenger in a car driven by her sister, defendant Gloria Pastran, when it was struck by an automobile driven by defendant Cathryn MacAdam. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment in her favor after a jury verdict in the amount of $3,000. Plaintiff raises numerous contentions on appeal relating to the testimony of various physicians, time restrictions imposed by the trial court, jury instructions, cost awards, and the new trial motion. In the published portion of this opinion we address the questions of whether the trial court erroneously declined to permit videotaping of a court-ordered medical examination conducted pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.[1] Solely pursuant to a concession, we reverse in part the order denying plaintiff’s motion to tax costs. The judgment is in all other respects affirmed.
II.-III. D. 1[4]
1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.
Plaintiff’s principal contention with respect to the court-ordered medical examination of her is that it was prejudicial error to deny her request to videotape the physical examination. To date, no California appellate court has determined whether the Civil Discovery Act of 1986 can be construed to permit videotaping of a physical examination. Under the law in existence prior to the enactment of the 1986 act, the proposed videotaping of a defense medical examination was considered by the Supreme Court in Edmiston v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 699 , 702-704 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 276 , 586 P.2d 590 ], The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate an order that a defense medical examination be videotaped. (Id. at pp. 700-701.) The court held former section 2032, governing medical examinations, did not expressly authorize videotaping and the plaintiff had not shown the videotaping to be necessary. (22 Cal.3d at pp. 703-704.) Section 2032, subdivision (a), then provided: “In an action in which the . . . physical condition . . . of a party, is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical. . . examination by a physician . . . .” (Former § 2032, subd. (a), repealed by Stats. 1986, ch. 1334, § 1, p. 4700, reenacted by Stats. 1986, ch. 1336, § 1, pp. 4747-4752, reenactment amended by Stats. 1987, ch. 86, §§ 14, 20, pp. 335-341; Edmiston v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 701.) The statute expressly authorized a written report of the examiner’s findings and conclusions (former § 2032, subd. (b)(1); Edmiston v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 702), but did not provide for recording of medical examinations by videotaping. The Supreme Court concluded it was for the Legislature to determine whether videotaping of medical examinations should be authorized. {Id. at p. 704.)
The Supreme Court had previously held that a plaintiff could have his or her attorney present during a defense medical examination and a court reporter present “ ‘to report, or later testify to, what occurred during the examination.’ (Gonzi v. Superior Court [(1959)] 51 Cal.2d 586 , 589 [ 355 P.2d 97 ].)” (Edmiston v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 702.) In Edmiston, the court cited with approval the case of Ebel v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 934 , 937 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 722 ], in which the Court of Appeal had held “ ‘the use of any mechanical device capable of attaining the same objective [as in Gonzi] is permissible.’ [Citation.]” {Ibid.) The Court of Appeal in Ebel had approved the use of a tape recorder. (Ibid.) Ebel v. Superior Court, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 937.) However, as noted previously, the Supreme Court held that no videotaping of the examination could occur.
Former section 2032 was repealed and reenacted in a different form effective July 1, 1987. (Stats. 1987, ch. 86, § 14, pp. 335-341; Stats. 1986,
III. E.-III. J.[4]
The order denying plaintiff Grace Ramirez’s motion to tax costs as claimed by defendant Gloria Pastran is reversed in part. The matter is remanded for entry of a new order granting plaintiffs motion to tax costs solely as to the expert witness fees paid or payable to Milton Ashby, M.D., in the amount of $4,850, and awarding defendant Gloria Pastran as costs the ordinary witness fees payable to Dr. Ashby. The trial court’s ruling on
Grignon, J., and Boren, J.,[4] concurred.
* Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Two, sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
Footnotes
- * See footnote, ante, page 1638.
- * See footnote, ante, page 1638.
Cases cited
- Edmiston v. Superior Court 22 Cal.3d 699 at 702-704 p. 1640
- Gonzi v. Superior Court 51 Cal.2d 586 at 589 p. 1640
- Ebel v. Superior Court 39 Cal.App.3d 934 at 937 p. 1640