Sonoma State University v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board

(Department of Corrections v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 810 , 816 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 716 ].) An employee who is unable to meet this threshold for establishing industrial causation has not demonstrated a compensable injury and cannot receive a workers’ compensation award for the injury.

C. Interpretation of “[PJsychiatric [IJnjury’’ as Used in Section 3208.3

Petitioners Sonoma State and Octagon Risk Services (collectively Sonoma State) argue that Hunton did not meet the predominant causation threshold for compensation eligibility because work related events had caused only 35 percent of Hunton’s overall psychiatric disability. Hunton argues, and the WCAB agreed, that she did satisfy the threshold requirement because one of her diagnosed psychological disorders was wholly attributable to work-related causes and, thus, constituted a compensable psychiatric injury. The question, then, is how one defines “psychiatric injury” when calculating industrial causation under section 3208.3, subdivision (b)(1). Must the predominance of industrial factors be proven with respect to the psychiatric injury in its entirety? Or, does a separately identifiable disorder, comprising only a portion of the psychiatric disability but wholly work related, constitute a compensable psychiatric injury? As there are no judicial precedents addressing this issue, we rely on principles of statutory construction for guidance.

The primary purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (E.g., Scripps Health v. Marin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 324 , 332 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 86 ].) “Statutory interpretation begins with the text and will end there if a plain reading renders a plain meaning; a meaning without ambiguity, uncertainty, contradiction, or absurdity.” (Oden v. Board of Administration (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 194 , 201 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 388 ].) The court may also resort to the legislative history of the statute and the historical circumstances of its enactment when attempting to ascertain legislative intent. (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1174 , 1180 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 467 ] (PG&E).) Applying these rules of interpretation, a court must “select the [statutory] construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.” (People v. Jenkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 234 , 246 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 903 , 893 P.2d 1224 ].)

Looking first to the language of the statute, it defines the term “psychiatric injury” as follows: “A psychiatric injury shall be compensable if it is a mental disorder which causes disability or need for medical treatment, and it is diagnosed pursuant to . . . the terminology and diagnostic criteria of . . . psychiatric diagnostic manuals generally approved and accepted nationally by practitioners in the field of psychiatric medicine.” (§ 3208.3, subd. (a).) A fair reading of this language precludes neither the WCAB’s interpretation — that Hunton’s adjustment disorder, independent of her other psychological problems, constitutes a compensable psychological injury — nor Sonoma State’s interpretation — that the term “psychiatric injury” encompasses all diagnoses contributing to the psychological disability. We turn then to legislative history for additional signposts.

Section 3208.3 was originally enacted as “part of the Legislature’s response to increased public concern about the high cost of workers’ compensation coverage, limited benefits for injured workers, suspected fraud and widespread abuses in the system, and particularly the proliferation of workers’ compensation cases with claims for psychiatric injuries.” (Hansen v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Bd. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1179 , 1183-1184 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 30 ].) At that time, the Legislature took the unusual step of codifying the underlying purpose of its enactment: “It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to establish a new and higher threshold of compensability for psychiatric injury under this division.” (§ 3208.3, subd. (c).) Given this clearly articulated legislative purpose, “any interpretation of the [statute] that would lead to more or broader claims should be examined closely . . . .” (PG&E, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1182.)

Section 3208.3 originally provided that a psychiatric injury was compensable if it was at least 10 percent attributable to industrial factors. (Stats. 1989, ch. 892, § 25, p. 3003.) But the Legislature further tightened the requirements for compensating psychiatric injury in 1993 by amending section 3208.3 to require that industrial factors be “predominant as to all causes combined of the psychiatric injury.” (§ 3208.3, subd. (b)(1); see Stats. 1993, ch. 118, § 1, p. 1225.) This amendment was apparently intended to further combat fraudulent psychiatric claims. (Sakotas v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 262 , 272-273 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 153 ].) “In recognition of this intent, the Governor’s signature message to the California Assembly contained the following language: [¶] ‘This package of reforms saves money by tightening the standard for stress claims in the system, the fastest growing type of claim in . . . workers’ compensation.’ ” (Id. at p. 273.)

In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1237 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 865 ], this court (Court of Appeal First Appellate District, Division Four) considered whether the compensability standard of section 3208.3 governed not only purely psychiatric injuries, but also psychological disorders caused by work-related physical injuries. In Lockheed Martin, the WCAB had interpreted the statute narrowly to exclude from the “predominant cause” requirement any psychiatric injuries that were the result of physical injuries. (Lockheed Martin, at p. 1245.) This court reversed, holding that such an interpretation could not be squared with the Legislature’s intent to “[take] aim[] primarily at phony stress claims.” (Id. at p. 1249.) “[T]he potential for fraud and the problems inherent in psychiatric claims, ‘notably vagueness in defining the injury and problems of establishing industrial causation and apportionment’ [citation], exist no less because the alleged psychiatric injury is related to a physical injury.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)

Similarly, here, the WCAB’s interpretation would undermine rather than effectuate the Legislature’s purpose. Allowing each diagnosable psychological disorder to be analyzed separately for compensability would create a lower rather than a higher threshold for obtaining compensation, would result in more rather than fewer stress claims, and would provide more rather than less potential for fraud. Further, the WCAB’s interpretation of the statute could lead to absurd or unfair results. If a claimant were allowed to isolate particular disorders for the purpose of establishing compensability, then a claimant with one industrially-caused disorder contributing only 10 percent to his or her psychological disability would meet the causation threshold required for compensation eligibility while a claimant with an undifferentiated diagnosis, whose injury is 50 percent attributable to industrial causes, would not meet the threshold. This interpretation would award compensation to those applicants whose experts are prompted to parse the psychological injuries into separate diagnoses even though the work-induced components are de minimis, while precluding compensation for employees whose work was a substantial factor in causing their injuries but whose experts did not or could not make compartmentalized diagnoses. We are satisfied this could not have been what the Legislature meant to do in adopting section 3208.3.

Accordingly, we hold that a claimant’s psychiatric injury satisfies the standard for compensability set forth in section 3208.3 only if it is proven that events of employment were predominant as to all causes combined of the psychiatric disability taken as a whole.

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he award of workers’ compensation benefits is annulled, and the matter is remanded to the WCAB with directions to enter an order denying such benefits. The parties shall bear their own costs in the proceedings before this court.

Ruvolo, R J., and Reardon, J., concurred.