Majority
OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and a new trial granted.
To establish a prima facie case of negligence based wholly on circumstantial evidence, "[i]t is enough that [plaintiff] shows facts and conditions from which the negligence of the defendant and the causation of the accident by that negligence may be reasonably inferred” (Ingersoll v Liberty Bank, 278 NY 1 , 7). The law does not require that plaintiff’s proof "positively exclude every other possible cause” of the accident but defendant’s negligence (ibid, [quoting Rosenberg v Schwartz, 260 NY 162 , 166]). Rather, her proof must render those other causes sufficiently "remote” or "technical” to enable the jury to reach its verdict based not upon speculation, but upon the logical inferences to be drawn from the evidence (see, e.g., Spett v President Monroe Bldg. & Mfg. Corp., 19 NY2d 203 , 205; Market v Spencer, 5 NY2d 958 , affg without opn 5 AD2d 400 ).
Although plaintiff may in her attempt to meet that burden include proof tending to negate the significance of other
Here, as in Haber v Cross County Hosp. ( 37 NY2d 888 , 889, on remand 50 AD2d 885 , appeal dismissed 38 NY2d 1001 ), plaintiff established her prima facie case by proof of the hospital’s rule requiring that the side rails on the bed of a patient over 70 years of age be maintained in raised position at all times and by evidence (viewed in the light 'most favorable to plaintiff, as it must be, Betzag v Gulf Oil Corp., 298 NY, at p 364, supra) from which the jury could reasonably conclude that it was more likely that a hospital staff person had lowered the bed rails than that plaintiff’s decedent, a weak and elderly patient who required assistance in getting out of bed, who remembered only that she had rolled over and who had landed face down on the floor parallel to the lowered bed rail, had done so. The more particularly is this so because the location of the spring latch (at the foot of the bed), the force required to effect its release and the patient’s deteriorated physical condition tended to prove that she was not able to lower the rail.
Plaintiff was not required to prove the exact nature of defendant’s negligence (Markel v Spencer, supra), nor did her deposition testimony, read into evidence by defendant, that she knew how to lower the bed rails and had on occasion done so, require dismissal of plaintiff’s case for the jury could have concluded that her reference to the "button” involved was to the device for lowering or raising the bed mattress, not to the spring latch which had to be released before the bed rail could be lowered.
Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Meyer, Simons, Kaye,
On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.4), order reversed, etc.
Cases cited
- Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank 278 NY 1 at 7 p. 744
- Rosenberg v. Schwartz 260 NY 162 at 166 p. 744
- Spett v. President Monroe Building & Manufacturing Corp. 19 NY2d 203 at 205 p. 744
- Markel v. Spencer 5 NY2d 958 p. 744
- Markel v. Spencer 5 AD2d 400 p. 744
- Betzag v. Gulf Oil Corp. 298 NY 358 p. 745
- Maresca v. Lake Motors, Inc. 25 NY2d 716 p. 745
- Balsam v. Frank Nicolosi Building Co. 36 AD2d 533 p. 745
- Haber v. Cross County Hospital 37 NY2d 888 at 889 p. 745
- Halloran v. Virginia Chemicals Inc. 38 NY2d 1001 p. 745