Majority
Headnote
1. Appeal and Error (§ 927*)—Presumption—Nonsuit.The defendant Smith is the owner of a building in Mechanicville, the second, floor of which was arranged for the occupation of tenants; the defendant himself residing at the time of the
[1] The plaintiff was nonsuited, and is, accordingly, entitled in this' court to the most favorable inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, including every fair deduction from the undisputed facts. Voloslco v. Interurban St. Ry. Co., 190 N. Y. 206 , 82 N. E. 1090 , 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1117 ; Gordon v. Ashley, 191 N. Y. 186 , 83 N. E. 686 . Assuming, therefore, all the facts proven and all the most favorable inférenees that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the question arises: Are the defendants, or either of them, liable ?
[2] Under normal conditions, and independent of any covenant binding him to do so, the landlord of an apartment house is bound to keep the common hallways and stairways in good repair. McAdam on Landlord and Tenant, p.1233; Dollard v. Roberts, 130 N. Y. 269 , 29 N. E. 104 , 14 L. R. A. 238 ; Sciolaro v. Asch, 198 N. Y. 77 , 91 N. E. 263 , 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 945 .
[3] When the landlord undertakes to make repairs or alterations in an apartment house, and permits the same to be occupied by his tenants while such repairs are going on, he is not released from responsibility, but is held to a higher degree of care, and is liable for the
[4] The law imposes these duties upon the landlord, and he cannot delegate them to others, either under normal conditions or while repairs are being made, so as to relieve himself from responsibility. “One who is personally bound to perform a duty cannot relieve himself from the burden of such obligation by any contract which he may make for its performance by another.'’ Sciolaro v. Asch, 198 N. Y. 77 , 91 N. E. 263 , 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 945 ; Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (5th Ed.) § 14.
[5] And the landlord owes the same duty of care to the guests of , tenants as he does to tenants. Hilsenbeck v. Guhring, 131 N. Y. 674 , 30 N. E. 580 .
[6] Assuming all the facts, and considering all the inferences arising from the evidence, and applying these well-established rules of law, it seems clear that the landlord, the defendant Smith, was liable. He lived only a few feet away from the building; he permitted his tenants to continue to occupy the building while it was being altered; he had never warned them not to use the common hallway or the front stairway; he received rent; he placed no lights in the common hallway, and made no arrangements with the contractors to place lights there; he erected no barricades; he permitted the hallway to be littered and obstructed; he did nothing personally, in short, to insure the safety of his tenants and their guests. Had the landlord been put to his defense, perhaps he would have been able to prove his freedom from negligence; but, as the case now stands, his negligence is apparent.
The defendant Johnson, the subcontractor, apparently paid no attention to the tenants, or in any manner considered their safety. He had been working in the building two weeks, and in the common hallway, and it must be presumed that he knew the apartments were occupied. Notwithstanding this, he left the hallway littered and obstructed ; he erected no barricade; he placed no light or lantern on the obstacles; he posted no warning notices; he failed to observe the most simple and ordinary precautions—in fact, he did nothing whatever to guard against accidents. Under these circumstances there can be no doubt of his negligence. “The law imposes on a person engaged in the prosecution of any work an obligation to perform it in such a manner as not to endanger the lives or persons of others. * * * ” 29 Cyc. 425; Wittenberg v. Seitz, 8 App. Div. 439 , 40. N. Y. Supp. 899; Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567 , 15 Am. Rep. 530 .
It is the duty of any person making repairs in a common hallway, or passageway, or street, or place where people are lawfully traveling, to take reasonable precautions against accidents.
The defendant Johnson seeks to relieve himself from the consequences of this rule by pointing out that there were no contractual relations between himself and the plaintiff; but this duty to be careful does not grow out of a contractual relation. It arises from that basic and necessary regulation of civilization which forbids any person, because o*
Dissent
[7] Concerning the question of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence, that was clearly a question for the jury. It is true that the plaintiff knew the situation—the litter, the lumber, the mortar, the tools, the rubbish, the darkness, the unfinished condition; but she was not a trespasser. She had a right to be there. It was her duty, however, to be careful; in fact, it was her.duty to exercise much greater care than would be necessary in an ordinary hallway; where no repairs . were being made. But whether or not she was careful was a question for the jury.
From the above reasoning it follows that the nonsuit was improper, and that a new trial should be granted, with costs.
WOODWARD, J., concurs.
[8] I dissent from a reversal as to Contractor Johnson. In the making of the repairs he necessarily obstructed the hallway to an extent, and rendered the hallway unsafe for travel at night unless the hall were lighted. But this was not a public hallway. No pit or trap was left there for an unwary person to fall into. He might reasonably assume that, if a tenant chose to remain while such repairs were being made with her full knowledge, she would assume the risk of ordinary obstruction to the hallway as far as he himself was concerned, and would look to her landlord for such protection as she might need. The covenant of the principal contractor to be responsible for all damages arising by reason of his repairs adds nothing to the liability of the defendant Johnson, who in no way made himself a party to such covenant. It simply made the principal contractor either a principal or a surety for the landlord. The duty of Contractor Johnson is the same as though such covenant had not been made. I therefore vote to sustain the nonsuit as to the defendant Johnson.
LYON, J., concurs.
Judgment reversed, and new trial granted, costs to abide event, as to the defendant Smith. All concur, except KELLOGG, J., dissenting. As to the defendant Johnson, judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur, except HOWARD and WOODWARD, JJ., dissenting.
(dissenting). The building had been generally overhauled. The stairway leading to the second floor had been taken out and was located at a different place. The skeleton of the new stairs was up, but the regular treads were not placed 'upon the risers and stair frame. Evidently) rough boards were nailed on to enable the workmen and others to malee temporary use of the stairs. The floors were littered with plaster, dirt, shavings, lumber, nails, and other things. No front door had been placed upon the hall, and the hall had not been wired for electricity, although the upper hallway
Dissent
The plaintiff and Mrs. Baxter were visiting the Floyd apartment. They entered during the daytime, and were frequent visitors, and knew well the conditions. They left the Floyd apartment after dark, Mrs. Floyd accompanying them. In going down the stairs Mrs. Baxter fell against the plaintiff, causing her to fall, and causing the injury complained of. Mrs. Baxter says:
“Mrs. Hicks went down a few steps ahead of me, down the steps. I was walking on her right along the wall. My feet struck, stepped on something that gave way with me. I felt for the step with my left foot, and my heel caught in something in the stairs, and threw me downstairs.”
There was upon the landing a doorframe, but it is evident that it did not cause Mrs. Baxter’s fall, as the frame was found in its correct position, and therefore did not give way. Apparently she slipped upon the plaster, or shavings, or some other substance that littered the stairway, and her foot caught the opening between the riser and the temporary tread; the opening being two or three inches. It is therefore evident that the doorframe had nothing to do with the accident, except that it was an additional warning to the parties, as to the general condition of the stairway and the building, that the stairway was not intended for general use, but was in the hands of the carpenters. The plaintiff evidently knew of the back entrance, as the evidence indicates her frequent visits to the apartment, and unless she shut her eyes when she entered the Floyd apartment she must have seen that she was taking chances in using the stairway in that condition. She took the same chances that any person takes in going into a building which is being built or repaired, and in attempting to use the temporary stairs which are intended for the use of the workmen.
I favor an affirmance.
Cases cited
- Volosko v. Interurban Street Railway Co. 190 N. Y. 206 p. 138
- Gordon v. Ashley 191 N. Y. 186 p. 138
- Dollard v. Roberts 130 N. Y. 269 p. 138
- Sciolaro v. Asch 198 N. Y. 77 at 91 p. 138, p. 139
- Hilsenbeck v. Guhring 131 N. Y. 674 p. 139
- Wittenberg v. Seitz 8 App. Div. 439 p. 139
- Mullen v. St. John 57 N. Y. 567 p. 139