Majority
Headnote
1. Mandamus—Appointment Under Civil Service Laws.The applicant rests his claim to the appointment to the position in question upon the laws in relation to, honorably discharged soldiers and sailors of the late war. I deem it unnecessary at this time to review the various acts of the legislature ip relation to veterans. His claim seems to me to rest upon the provisions of chapters. 716 and 717 of the Laws of 1894. These acts became laws upon the same day. They contain no provisions necessarily inconsistent with each other, and therefore are to be construed as one law. They entitle him, in certain cases, to a preference over all others not veterans. The position he seeks is one under the superintendent of uublic buildings. Under chapter 227, Laws.18.93, the superintendent of public buildings has power, “subject to the approval of the trustees, to appoint all persons necessary to the maintenance of the department of public buildings and the grounds under his charge.” The persons so authorized to be appointed by ' him are not public officers, but employés. No authority is vested ip him, or in the trustees of the public buildings, to create. an, office. The remedy by mandamus, I therefore think, is the proper one.
Chapter 716 of the Laws of 1894—the law which gives honorably discharged soldiers and sailors a preference—has the following proviso : “But the provisions of this act shall not be construed to apply to the position of private secretary or deputy of any official or department, or to any other person holding a strictly confidential position.” The application must affirmatively show that the position he seeks is not one of those excepted from the preference to be given to veterans. The particular position sought by the applicant, for which he filed his application with the superintendent of public buildings, is designated as that of “deputy superintendent,” a position or employment that appears to have been created and named by the superintendent of public buildings. Now, while I am inclined to think that this provision of the statute, so far as it refers to deputies, refers to officers, as such, created by statute, who are by law clothed with the power and authority of the principal officer in his absence or inability to act, and that it does not refer to an employé who may have been, for convenience, but improperly, naméd deputy, —who is not clothed with any official power or authority, and has no right, under the statute, to act for or in the place of the principal
Application denied, without costs.