Topham v. Interurban Street Railway Co.

This appeal comes before this court upon the allowance of an appeal, by the justices of the Appellate Term. Mr. Justice Freedman, in a learned and exhaustive opinion, has traced the history of the statutory law of the state bearing upon the authority conferred by the Legislature upon street surface railroads to construct, operate, lease, and enter into traffic contracts from the inception of the right down to the present time, and reached the conclusion that the lease entered into between the defendant and the Metropolitan Street Railway Company was made and executed pursuant to the provisions of the railroad law as it now exists (Laws 1892, p. 1382, c. 676), and that section 104, p. 1406, of that act, is not limited to traffic contracts alone, but embraces contracts of lease as- well. With that conclusion we agree. The same question was considered by this court, and the same conclusion reached, in Mendoza v. Metropolitan Street Railway Company, 48 App. Div. 62 , 62 N. Y. Supp. 580 ; s. c., on motion for reargument, 51 App. Div. 430 , 64 N. Y. Supp. 745 . ■ It was also adverted to by the Appellate Division in the Second Department, and the same result asserted, in Barnett v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 53 App. Div. 432 , 65 N. Y. Supp. 1068 . Since that decision, we have been furnished with a manuscript copy of the opinion delivered by the same court in O’Reilly v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 89 N. Y. Supp. 41 , wherein that court has decisively determined that the construction of the statute in this respect was the same as had been announced by that court in its former decision, and by the decisions of this court. Whatever difference of view presently exists in this court upon this subject, I do not

We also agree with the learned court below that the statute in question authorizes the recovery of cumulative penalties in one action. The language upon such subject is, “for every refusal.” This language was held in Suydam v. Smith, 52 N. Y. 383 , to permit the recovery of cumulative penalties, and that case distinguishes Fisher v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. R. Co., 46 N. Y. 644 . The same distinction is main-' tained in all the subsequent decisions upon the subject. The Second Department, in Suffolk County v. Shaw, 21 App. Div. 146 , 47 N. Y. Supp. 349 , adopted the same construction, holding that the language is equivalent to “each and every.” Cox v. Paul, 175 N. Y. 328 , 67 N. E. 586 , is not in conflict with this conclusion. The language of the statute in that case was, “for any refusal * * * the officer or agent so refusing shall each forfeit.” The court held that, from the language of the statute, but one penalty could be recovered, and that the word “any” was not the equivalent of “each” or “every.” The language in the present case is different, arid this is ground for the difference in conclusion.

As I view this case, however, this determination of these questions in favor of the plaintiff does not suffice to show that he is necessarily entitled to a recovery in this action; nor does it result in the affirmance of the order from which the appeal is taken.. The real question which the case presents turns upon the construction to be given to section 104 of the railroad law (Laws 1892, p. 1406, c. 676). If that section is to be construed as constituting a mandatory provision by the Legislature that the defendant shall, upon demand, and without extra charge, give to each passenger paying one single fare a transfer over its line of railroads at any point of intersection with a leased line, then there is an end of this case, and the judgment must be affirmed. If, however, that section be construed as authorizing the defendant, in the operation of its railroad, to so operate the same, and furnish transfers to passengers at such points upon its intersecting lines, as will best serve the convenience of the traveling public, by designating particular transfer points, and that such designations will accomplish the purpose of the act, then compliance therewith will have been shown.. In order to have a clear view of this question, the provisions of the section are to be carefully scrutinized. It reads:

“See. 104. Contracting Corporations to Carry for One Fare—Penalty. Every such corporation entering into such contract shall carry or permit any other party thereto to carry between any two points on the railroads or portions thereof embraced in such contract any passenger desiring to make one continuous trip between such points for one single fare, not higher than the fare lawfully chargeable by either of such corporations for an adult passenger. Every such corporation shall upon demand, and without extra charge, give to each passenger paying one single fare a transfer, entitling such passenger to one continuous trip to any point or portion of any railroad embraced in such contract, to the end that the public convenience may be promoted by the operation of the railroads embraced in such contract substantially as a single railroad with a single rate of fare. For every refusal to comply with the. requirements of this section the corporation so refusing shall forfeit fifty dollars to the aggriev

ed party. Tim provisions of this section shall apply only to railroads wholly within the limits of any one incorporated city or village.”

The primary purpose of this section is to compel the railroad corporation to carry over the lines of road operated by it passengers by such method as will best promote the convenience of the public who travel thereon. The learned court below assumed that the section was to be construed as mandatory provisions, requiring that a transfer should be given at every intersecting point, and, in disposition of the suggestion that the corporation might adopt rules or a method in carrying the public over its lines by which transfers might be .denied at some points, said:

“The fact that there was another route embraced within the defendant’s system, over which the plaintiff on each occasion might have traveled for a single fare, can make no difference; and the fact that the giving of transfers at the point in question might cause undue crowding in the street and at the crossing is no excuse for not giving them, unless sanctioned by legislative action.”

No further discussion of such subject was had in making disposition of the question. It is evident that, if the words of the provision which we have italicized do nothing more than declare that the issuance of transfers at all intersecting points will promote the public convenience, then such language might as well have been omitted from the section, as it neither adds to nor takes from the preceding provisions of the ■section, as the language therein contained is clearly mandatory. Indeed, the injection of this language into the section creates, in this view, somewhat of ambiguity, if it is to be thus limited, as it in no wise adds to the clearness of the preceding provision. The intent of the Legislature is the cardinal rule by which statutes are to be interpreted. It was said by the Presiding Justice of this court in Central Trust Co. v. New York Equipment Co., 74 Hun, 405 , 26 N. Y. Supp. 850 :

“A strict and literal interpretation is not always to be adhered to, and, where the ease is brought within the intention of the makers of the statute, it is within the statute, although by a technical interpretation it is not within its letter. It is the spirit and purpose of a statute which is to be regarded in its interpretation, and, if this find fair expression in the statute, it should be so construed as to carry out legislative intent, even though such construction is contrary to the literal meaning of some of the provisions of the statute. A reasonable construction should be adopted in all cases where there is a doubt ■or uncertainty in regard to the intention of the lawmakers.”

And this rule is abundantly supported by authority, and variously illustrated in the cases. People ex rel. Savings Bank v. Butler, 147 N. Y. 164 , 41 N. E. 416 . It was said by Ruger, J., in People ex rel. Collins v. Spicer, 99 N. Y. 225 , 1 N. E. 680 :

“In looking for the intent of the Legislature, not only the language of the statute may be resorted to, but also the circumstances which occasioned its enactment, and the object professed in its title; and, if by these aids the intent of the act can be clearly ascertained, effect may be given to it, although no retrospective words are contained in the law.”

“When a general intention is expressed, and also a particular intention incompatible with the general intention, the particular intention is to be considered in the nature of an exception.” People ex rel. Churchyard v. Board of Councilmen (Super. Buff.) 20 N. Y. Supp. 51 , affirmed on opinion below in 135 N. Y. 660 , 32 N. E. 648 .

I am of opinion, therefore, that the true construction of the section vests somewhat of authority in the defendant to fix transfer points where the convenience of the greatest number of the traveling public will be subserved in going to and from their respective points of destination; and, if this result was obtained by the transfer points which were established at the time when this action was brought, no right of action existed, even though such right was denied at the particular point. When the defendant has made provision for the issuance of transfers at intersecting points where the public convenience will be

This construction of the statute, however, does not avail the defendant in the present case, as it has pleaded no such defense in its answer, nor has it proved the same upon the trial. There is not a suggestion in the answer that the defendant has at any time fixed transfer points which will promote the convenience of the traveling public. The nearest approach to it is in paragraph 10, where it is averred that at the time in question there were other lines of railway which the plaintiff might have taken to reach his point of destination as easily and equally as well as to use the lines mentioned and described in the complaint. There is, however, no averment that these lines of road were under the control of, or being operated by, the defendant; and, while such fact can doubtless be determined by a reference to the lease, which is a part of plaintiff’s proof, yet there is no averment that it issued transfers at intersecting points upon such line, or that it issued a transfer at its intersection with Eighteenth street, which would have carried the plaintiff to his destination. An examination of the testimony also fails to show that the defendant has made any compliance whatever with the provisions of section 104, or that the plaintiff could have reached his destination by a single fare over any line operated by the defendant. The witness called to establish the fact of the issuance of the transfer failed, in his recollection upon such subject, and could not testify that retransfers were issued; nor does it appear that such question has been presented in such form as to be available to the defendant in any of the cases now pending before this court.

Since the foregoing was written, Mr. Justice INGRAHAM has considered the whole subject in an opinion handed down herewith. I concur in his opinion so far as it affects the leases made prior to May 1, 1891, for the reasons assigned by him. The provisions of section 78 (page 1398) expressly exclude its application to any lease in existence prior to May 1,1891. The lease of the Broadway line falls within such exception, in consequence of which there was no obligation resting upon the defendant to issue transfers at Twenty-Third street and Broadway.

My conclusion, therefore, is that the determination of the Appellate Term in this case should be reversed, and the judgment of the Municipal Court affirmed, with costs.

LAUGHEIN, J., concurs. VAN BRUNT, P. J., concurs in result.

I do not agree in the construction given by the learned court from which this appeal is taken to section 104 of the railroad law (chapter 676, p. 1406, Laws 1892). I do not understand that *sar decision in the case of Mendoza v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 48 App. Div. 62 , 62 N. Y. Supp. 580 , upon reargument, 51 App. Div. 430 , 64 N. Y.

This action is based upon refusals of the defendant to give to the plaintiff transfers which would entitle him to one continuous trip from a point on Twenty-Third street to a point on Broadway, upon the line of the Broadway & Seventh Avenue Railroad Company, and from a point on the Broadway & Seventh Avenue Line to a point on the Twenty-Third Street Line. The line of the Twenty-Third Street Railroad intersects the Broadway & Seventh Avenue Line at the corner of Twenty-Third street and Broadway. For a first cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that he boarded one of the defendant’s cars at a point on Twenty-Third street east of Broadway, paid his fare, and at the same time demanded from the conductor a transfer to be used over the Broadway and Seventh avenue line from the intersection of the said line at Broadway and Twenty-Third street south to his destination, which was refused; and the plaintiff demands a judgment for the penalty prescribed by section 104 of the railroad law (chapter 676, p. 1406, Laws 1892). There were several other causes of action all based upon a similar refusal—some being for a refusal to give a transfer from the Broadway & Seventh Avenue Line to the Twenty-Third Street Line, and some from the Twenty-Third Street Line to the Broadway & Seventh Avenue Line; and the single question is presented as to whether the defendant, who was operating these two lines under a lease of a corporation who was the lessee of both the Broadway & Seventh Avenue Railroad and the Twenty-Third Street Railroad, was required by section 104 of the railroad law to give such a transfer.'

Section 104 of the railroad law is contained in article 4 of that act, relating to street surface railroads. That article provides for the incorporation of street surface railroads, and the conditions under which such corporations may be authorized to construct a railroad upon and along the street, avenue, road, or highway in any city, town, or village of the state. The article contains no provision authorizing railroad corporations to make contracts with each other, but section 104 provides that:

“Every such corporation entering into such contract shall carry or permit any other party thereto to carry betwéen any two points on the railroads or portions thereof embraced in such contract any passenger desiring to make one continuous trip between such points for one single fare, not higher than the fare lawfully chargeable by either of such corporations for an adult passenger. Every such corporation shall upon demand, and without extra charge, give to each passenger' paying one single fare a transfer, entitling such passenger to one continuous trip to any point or portion of any railroad embraced in such contract, to the end that the public convenience may be promoted by the operation of the railroads embraced in such contract substantially as a single railroad with a single rate of fare.”

And a penalty is provided for a refusal to comply with this provision.

By section 78 (page 1398) of the railroad law, authority is given for any railroad corporation, or any corporation owning or operating any railroad or railroad route within this state, to contract with any other such corporation for the use of their respective roads or routes, or any

The railroad law was originally enacted as chapter 565, p. 1082, of the Laws of 1890. Sections 103, 104, and 105 (page 1114) of that law were taken from sections 1, 3, and 4 of chapter 305, pp. 525, 526, of the Laws of 1885. It was amended in 1892, when sections 103 and 105, which were sections 1 and 3 of the act of 1885, were repealed, and section 4 of the act of 1885, re-enacted as section 105 of the railroad law of 1890, was inserted in the railroad law of 1892 as section 104.

By the railroad law of 1890, the provision of section 105, “Every such corporation entering into such contract,” applied to a contract authorized by section 103 of the act; but, as section 103 was repealed by the amendment of 1892, section 105 of the act of 1890, which was made section 104 by the amendment of 1892, can only apply, as I understand it, to a contract made under section 78, which by express terms does not apply to a lease made prior to 1891. I cannot find that chapter 305, p. 525, of the Laws of 1885, has been repealed. It is not, however, necessary to consider whether or not the act of 1885 is in force, or what, if any, rights the plaintiff had under it, as the right of the plaintiff to recover is expressly limited by the complaint to a violation of section 104 of the railroad law of 1892. If section 104 of the railroad law does not apply, the Municipal Court was correct in awarding judgment for the defendant.

It seems to me that the refusal of the defendant to give to the plaintiff a transfer to ride from the point on the Twenty-Third Street Railroad Line to a point on the Broadway & Seventh Avenue Railroad Line, or a transfer to ride from a point on the Broadway & Seventh Avenue Railroad to a point on the Twenty-Third Street Line, was not a violation of section 104 of the railroad law, as amended in 1892. The Broadway & Seventh Avenue Railroad Company was incorporated under General Railroad Law of 1850 (Laws 1850, p. 211, c. 140), and by an indenture of lease dated the 13th of May, 1890, it leased all its railroads, including its leased lines, to the Houston, West Street & Pavonia Ferry Railroad Company. The Twenty-Third Street Railroad Company was organized under the general railroad act of 1850, and by an indenture of lease dated April 25, 1893, it leased to the Houston, West Street & Pavonia Ferry Railroad Company all its railroads, including leased lines, together with all the franchises, rights, powers, and privileges of the Twenty-Third Street Railroad Company; the Houston, West Street & Pavonia Ferry Railroad Company, thereby becoming the lessee of both roads. By an agreement dated April 29, 1893, the Houston, West Street & Pavonia Ferry Railroad Company consolidated with several other railroad corporations, and became the first Metropolitan Street Railway Company. The Metropolitan Street Railway Company, thus organized, subsequently consolidated with other companies and in April, 1902, the Metropolitan Street Railway Company, then operating both the Broadway & Seventh Avenue Railroad

This being the situation, the lease from the Twenty-Third Street Railroad Company to the Houston, West Street & Pavonia Ferry Railroad Company was executed and delivered. That lease, dated April 25, 1893, is between the Twenty-Third Street Railroad Company, party of the first part, and the Houston, West Street & Pavonia Ferry Railroad Company, party of the second part, and recites that the party of the first part owns and operates the street surface railroads and railroad routes in the city of New York upon Twenty-Third street from the North to the East river, and upon various other streets in the city of New York, and leases and operates the surface railroad and railroad route of the Bleecker Street & Fulton Ferry Railroad Company from Twenty-Third street, North river, to the Fulton Ferry and the Brooklyn Bridge; and the indenture granted, leased, and demised to the party of the second part and-its successors all the railroads of the party of the first part, including the leased lines now or thereafter to be constructed and operated during the pendency of the lease, together with all the franchises, rights, powers, and privileges of the party of the first part to maintain, construct, and operate a railroad, to have and to hold the same unto the party of the second part, its successors and assigns, for the unexpired term of the charter of the party of the first part, and any extensions of the said charter; and, as a consideration for this demise, the party of the second part agreed to maintain, manage, use, and operate the line of railroads leased, to pay all taxes, assessments, and charges imposed upon the demised property, and to pay quarterly an annual rental of 18 per cent, on the par value of the capital stock of the party of the first part, and assumes all debts and obligations of the party of the second part. In this lease there is no mention of the lines of railroad operated by the lessee or by the Broadway & Seventh Avenue Railroad Company. Neither of these railroads is described in the lease, or in any way referred to therein, and it does not appear from the instrument that the lessee was the owner of or operating any line of railroad in the city of New York. As a fact, it

I think that section 104 of the railroad law applies to contracts made in pursuance of section 78 of that law. By the express provisions of section 78, however, that section did not apply to any lease in existence prior to May 1, 1891. The Houston, West Street & Pavonia Ferry Railroad Company was therefore operating a railway under a lease by the Broadway & Seventh Avenue Railroad "Company made in April, 1890, and nothing in section 78 of the law applied to such a lease. Then section 104 provides that:

“Every such corporation entering into such contract [that is, such contract as is provided for by section 78] shall carry or permit any other party thereto to carry between any two points on the railroads or portions thereof embraced in such contract any passenger desiring to make one continuous trip between such points for a single fare.”

Now, “such contract” was one made in pursuance of section 78 of the act; and if the Broadway & Seventh Avenue Railroad Company, or the Houston, West Street & Pavonia Ferry Railroad Company, had made a contract with the Twenty-Third Street Railroad Company, authorized by section 78 of the act, it was then obliged to carry any passenger desiring to make one continuous trip between any two points on the railroads, or portions thereof, embraced in such contract, and to give each passenger paying one single fare a transfer entitling such passenger to one continuous trip to any point or portion of any railroad embraced in such contract; but it was only to the road or roads or portions thereof embraced in the contract to which a passenger was entitled to a transfer. A line of railroad operated by the Houston, West Street & Pavonia Ferry Railroad Company under a lease at the time it received the lease from the Twenty-Third Street Company was not a railroad embraced in the lease of the Twenty-Third Street Road. As before stated, there is no recital in the lease that the lessee is operating any railroad. The Broadway & Seventh Avenue Line is not mentioned in any way in the lease. The lease of the Twenty-Third Street Line had" no possible relation to or connection with the lease of the Broadway & Seventh Avenue Railroad, which was in existence be-' fore the passage of the act, and is by the express provisions of the act unaffected, by its provision. The obligation to give a transfer is not imposed upon two roads which make contracts in relation to each other, but, where a contract is made between two railroad companies, the statute imposes an obligation upon both companies to give to a passenger a transfer from one road to the other between two points on the railroads or portions thereof which are embraced in such contract. If it had been intended by this provision to include all railroads operated by the contracting parties, it certainly would have been easy to say so, but that is not the obligation that is imposed. It is the right of a pass

VAN BRUNT, P. J., concurs.

The history of the legislation bearing upon the subject of transfers shows that it has been the uniform policy with reference to franchises, dealing not alone with steam railroads, but with street surface railroads as well, that there should be no consolidation or leasing of competing lines; the theory being that it is in the interest of the public to have competing lines. It is conceded that this policy, as a favor to street railroads, has been departed from, but, in all the cases in which the right to consolidate or to lease contiguous lines has been granted, such leave or right was conditioned upon the corresponding benefit being conferred upon the public of obtaining a continuous ride for a single fare; and, to that end, it was the intent and purpose of the various acts to give to the public the right, over the lines leased or consolidated, to ride for a single fare. The present instance is not exceptional in the failure to express this idea clearly and in apt language. Having in mind the spirit and intent of the legislation, however, there is little difficulty, it seems to me, in reaching the conclusión that the language was intended to apply generally to all leases made by surface railroad companies, when leased by one to the other. The attempt, therefore, to limit this general policy by seizing on particular words in the statute which would have the act apply to leases made after a certain date, or dependent upon whether the passenger sought to ride on what before the lease was the lessor or the lessee company, is to do violence to tire spirit and intent of the legislation. As I have stated, the statute aimed at requiring as a consideration or condition for the benefit and advantage which would flow to the railroad companies from permitting them to make leases through which there was practically effected a consolidation of two or more lines, that the public should receive, as an equivalent for the concession granted, the right, for one fare, to be transferred over the leased lines.

As to construing the statute in detail, I do not think it necessary to add to what was said in the opinion of this court in Mendoza v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 51 App. Div. 430 , 64 N. Y. Supp. 745 , or to what has been said herein by the learned Appellate Term. For the reasons stated in those opinions, therefore, I think that the determination of the Appellate Term should be affirmed, with costs.