p. 586the devises of the premises conveyed to Cooney and Davis were wholly inoperative and void, inasmuch as Mrs. Clarke had no title to the same at the time the will tvas executed by her. He alleged that the acting executors of the will of Mrs. Clarke appropriated and applied the bonds and mortgages of Cooney, and Davis, or the proceeds thereof, to the residuary legatees of Mrs. Clarke, some or one of them, as part of her residuary estate. He stated that he was unable to give any explanation as to 347f acres of the 600 acres stated in the will to have been divided into farms, and to be specifically devised for the benefit of Samuel Clarke and his issue. . He presumes either that the same were sold by Mrs.. Clarke, in her lifetime, or that no counterparts of leases were .found among her-papers with the name of Samuel Clarke indorsed thereon to designate the.same.
The answer denied all the breaches of .trust alleged, and all liability.
A replication was filed and proofs taken.. The cause was transferred to this court. The. proofs established that the defendant,. and those whom he represented, had received the amount of the mortgages of Cooney and Davis, and also a bond of four hundred dollars, given for a part of the proceeds of the six hundred acres mentioned in the will as having been divided into farms. There was ho evidence showing the receipt of any thing from the lot of land described in the will as in the possession of one Northrup.
D. D. Field, for the plaintiffs.
I. The plaintiffs have .succeeded to all the rights of Mary, the sole surviving child of Samuel Clarke, under the will of Mary Clarke; and the defendant is .responsible as the legal representative of his father and mother, t.wo of the trustees under the will, for any breach of trust they may have committed. . (Lewin on Trusts and Trustees, 630, 634, and cases cited.) The defendant is also responsible as the sole surviving executor of Mrs. Clarke’s will.II. The breaches of trust charged are the diversion from the
p. 587beneficiaries of four out of five different items of property, devised for tbe benefit of Mr. Clarke’s children, viz.: the interest of the testatrix in the Northrup lot; in the house and lot in Hague-street; in the Foster lot; and in 347 acres of the Kayaderosseras patent. If such diversions were made, they were breaches of trust. As to the Northrup lot, the claim of the plaintiffs is substantially admitted by the answer. There must therefore be a decree in their favor for that; and a reference should be ordered to ascertain its value.III. The lot in Hague-street having been sold and mortgaged back to the testatrix before the date of her will, the devise is to take effect so as to pass the bond and mortgage. This is so for two reasons, either of which is sufficient to sustain it.1. There appears to have been a mistake made in describing the lot, instead of the bond and mortgage which were substituted for it. This must have happened either from her own forgetfulness and oversight, or from the draftsman having copied from a previous will, drawn before the sale of the lot. In case of mistake in the description of property, the court will ascertain by parol evidence what property was meant, and decree accordingly. The intent that Mr. Clarke should have the lot, or its proceeds, is manifest. (1 Story, Eq. § 179; 1 Jarman on Wills, 329; 1 Yes. Jr. 259; 3 Yes. 306; 11 East, 246, Doe v. Tofield; 2 Sim. 493, Benson v. Whittan ; 10 Paige, 140, Pond v. Beach; 1 Sandf. Ch. R. 330, Havens v. Havens; 3 Ibid. 77, Smith’s Ex’s. v. Wyckoff.)2. The mortgage of the lot back to the testatrix revested the fee in her, according to the law existing at the execution of the will, which fee passed by the devise, and carried with it the beneficial interest in the mortgage debt. (Powell on Mortgages, 408; 1 Jarm. 363, 633, 638, 714, 725; 5 Sim. 384, Le Gro v. Cocherell; 11 Sim. 469; 13 John. 537 , Jackson v. De Lancey.) For the same reasons the bond and mortgage upon the Foster lot passed under the devise of that lot.IY. The 347 acres under lease in the Kayaderosseras patent must be accounted for, or a sufficient reason for not doing so
p. 588given. The burden of proof lies upon the trustees. In this case no proof is produced, and no reason given.G. Wood, for the defendant.
I. The devises, in the will of Mary Clarke, of the house and lot of ground on Hague-street, and the lot in possession of H. Poster, were void and totally inoperative to pass any thing.1. The testatrix did not own the premises at the date of the will. And ownership or seisin by the testatrix, at the date of the will, was essential, to pass any title by devise. (Goodright v. Forrester, 1 Taunt. R. 578; Roe v. Griffith, 4 Burr. 1961; Campbell v. Sandys, 1 Sch. & Lef. 294; 8 East. 552, 563-4; Roberts on Wills, 297-8; 6 Cruise, Tit. 38, ch. 3, §§ 26, 28.)2. The mortgage debt would not pass under a devise of the land, it being totally distinct in its character, being a chose in action. (Edwards v. The Farmers’ Fire Insurance Company, 21 Wend. 490 , 491; Martin v. Rowlin, 2 Burr. 969, 978-9.)II. The devise of the lot in the Kayaderosseras patent, in the possession of Northrup, was void, and totally inoperative, to pass any thing. 1st. The land having been previously sold, belonged to the purchaser in equity; and the purchase money, being a chose in action, could not pass under a devise of land, which is a different thing, and in no respect identical. 2d. If the testatrix had owned the land at the time of the devise, and had subsequently contracted to sell it, the devise would have been revoked. 3d. There was no mistake of description by the testatrix. The mistake, if any, consisted in her not owning the land which she accurately described. 4th. Parol evidence would be inadmissible to explain the will, by showing a different tract from the one described was intended. (Mann v. Mann, 14 John. R. 1; Norwood v. Bard, 1 Richardson R. 135.)III. The court cannot conjecture that, if the testatrix had known she did not own the land, she would have given the respective choses in action instead thereof. This would be making a new will, by carrying the Cy pres doctrine of construction to a length unknown before, instead of restricting it,
p. 589as ought to be done. (Fearne Cont. Rem. 203, 208, n. &c.; Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. Jr.)By the Court.
The first question arises upon the devise of the house and lot in Hague-street, and the other lands which Mrs. Clarke had sold and conveyed before she made her will, and had received mortgages for the purchase money. It is contended, on the part of the defendant, that the lands did not pass under the devise, because she had no title, in them, and that the mortgages did not pass, because, a devise of land is a totally distinct thing from a gift of a mortgage debt. On the other hand, the plaintiffs claim that this is a mere mistake in the description of the property, and many authorities were cited to show that the courts will carry into effect the will of the testator, where it is clearly shown that it is an -error in 'description.
The rule established is very plain, that where it is clear that there was an intent that the property in question should pass, it will be held to pass, notwithstanding a misdescription, so long as there is enough of correspondence to afford the means of identifying the subject of the gift. The rule comes to this, that where it is necessary to carry out the intent that the will shall operate on the real estate, it will be held so to operate, although the«object is not thus described, and vice versa.
So when the devise is of land, and it turns out that the testator’s interest was a mortgage upon the-same.land, the la.w may-pass his estate as mortgagee, such as it actually existed, with all his rights and interests in the debt, and in the land itself growing out of that relation to it.. In a case like the present, where the testatrix once owned the land in fee, and had conveyed it, receiving a mortgage upon it for the purchase money, the intent to give such interest as she had in the land, or arising from it, is so. plain, that the court can have no hesitation in holding that the mortgage debts secured upon the lands devised passed to the objects of her bounty, as indicated by the gift of the lands.
It was contended, th’at-in truth the title was. revested in Mrs. Clarke by the mortgage, and that the mortgagor' had a mere
p. 590equity in the land. This was technically true, and it adds to the force of the reason founded on the manifest intent of the testatrix.
In such cases, the residuary devisees and legatees take the property in question as trustees for the persons for whom it was intended, and are bound to account for the proceeds, in the same manner as other trustees. The defendant must in this case account to the plaintiffs for the proceeds of the bonds and mortgages in question, as representing Benjamin Moore and his wife, by whom the same were received.
With respect to the six hundred acres mentioned in the will as divided into farms, it appears there were four leases of farms in that tract indorsed by the testatrix with the name of Samuel Clarke, of which farms all except one were disposed of either by him or by the testatrix in her lifetime. The defendant is shown to have received, on account of that farm, four hundred dollars, for which he is liable to the plaintiffs.
There must be a decree for an- account on the principles we have stated. Neither party will recover costs against the other to this time. All further questions and directions are reserved until the account is taken.