(1), though not named therein, may, by force of subsection (2), recover indemnity as if named therein as insured.
CJ.
In order to apply these enactments to the facts of this case we must read them as subject to the definition of " owner's policy " given in section 183, subsection (g):- It is contended that Kowaluk, the driver, comes within section 198 (1) by virtue of the fact that he was driving the automobile with the consent of Seaman, who was the " person named " in the policy within the meaning of section 183 (g) ; that is to say, "named in" the owner's policy " under which the action is brought. By the definition of " owner's policy " that contention rests upon the proposition that the automobile was " owned " by Seaman in the sense of that definition (section 183 supra). The Court of Appeal has taken the view that this question must be answered in the negative.
We are satisfied that the decision of the Court of Appeal on this point ought not to be reversed.
Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed with costs.
Per Davis J.-The incorporating statute clearly enacts that the exemp- DE tion is Only while the property is owned and occupied by the appellant association for the purposes of the corporation.
Moreover, the building cannot be assessed piecemeal; two or three rooms out of a large office building, for instance, cannot be left free from taxation and yet all the other rooms be subject to it; the building is either taxable or it is not taxable.-Whatever may be said as to the occupation of several different parts of the building, it is not disputed that two portions are rented for private office use and the theatre portion is leased on a yearly basis. On a fair interpretation of the statutory provision, the corporation to be entitled to exemption must occupy the immoveable property for its own purposes and it cannot be said to occupy the immoveable property when any substantial portion of it is in the occupation of others. The statute is not satisfied by showing that the corporation occupies some portion of the building for its own purposes.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec, affirming the judgment of the Recorder's Court of the city of Chicoutimi and maintaining the respondent city's action for the recovery of taxes on property owned by the appellant. The material facts of the case and the questions at issue are stated in the above head-note and in the judgments now reported.
Paul Leblanc and Jean Filion for the appellant. J. C. Gagn6 K.C. and J. A. Gagng K.C. for the respondent.
RINFRET J.-Pour les raisons que donne mon collkgue, M. le juge Taschereau, et dans lesquelles je concours, je suis d'avis que l'appel doit 6tre rejet6 avec d6pens. DAVIS J.-The appellant association was incorporated in 1916 by a special Act of the Quebec legislature, being 7 Geo. V, ch. 110. The object of the Association was by see 3, to assure to its members personal development by means of study circles, and to devote itself to all works of public utility within the domain of charity, education and moral, social, national and economic questions.
The preamble of the statute stated that the Association had been founded at Montreal in 1904, that it had existed since that date, and had a great many members grouped among over one hundred study circles.
JEUNESSE Then in 1932, by 22 Geo. V, ch. 136, the statute was amended.
The preamble to this amending statute, after LA repeating the object of the Association, proceeded to state, CicourIml. That, to realize the above purpose, it is necessary to develop in
Davis J. young men, members of the Association or not, besides intellectual and moral vigour, a robust physical constitution by sound and healthy athletic exercises.
It is to be noted that the words are " members of the
Association or not." The preamible proceeds to say
That such program demands that the (Association) found, in various parts of the province, establishments wherein will be taught and practised for purposes of education and of moral and physical training, all bodily exercises pertaining to physical culture and gymnastics; and that to attain such. objects the Association needs to acquire and possess moveable and immoveable property of a higher value than that presently fixed by its Charter.
The preamble proceeds to state that the Association has acquired by deed certain immoveable property in the city of Montreal from the National Amateur Athletic Association which, with the furniture and various moveable things, may serve to utilize the immoveable property " as a sporting and educational establishment "; and that, certain doubts having arisen as to the validity of the acquisition of this property, the validation of the deed of sale is required. Then follow in the preamble words that may be of importance in this case by way of explanation:
That, by its charter, the National Amateur Athletic Association benefited by certain privileges and tax exemptions:
That the (Association) by pursuing amongst other objects the work of the National Amateur Athletic Association, with a larger scope, needs the benefit of the same privileges;
That for such purposes the (Association) requires that more ample powers be granted in the exercise of its charter, and, particularly certain privileges and tax exemptions, and
Whereas it is expedient to grant its prayer;
There is then enacted sec. 1, which repeals sec. 4 of the original Act and substitutes a new section 4; sec. 2 of the amending statute validates the deed of sale from the National Amateur Athletic Association; and sec. 3 enacts that the Act shall come into force on the day of its sanction.
Reverting then to new sec. 4 with which we are concerned, it contains by repetition the general powers granted by the original statute but adds additional powers, amongst which is to be found one in these words: The words " for the use of its members and of the public" are to be noted. The omnibus clause is repeated:
As part of new sec. 4 and immediately following the enumeration of the powers of the corporation, are these words:
In this action the respondent, the city of Chicoutimi, sued the appellant Association for $4,060.64 for municipal and school taxes imposed for the fiscal years 1936 and 1937 in respect of the appellant's immovable property in the said city.
The appellant took the ground that its said property was exempt from these taxes under the amending statute above mentioned but in its defence, while it pleaded that the entry on the valuation roll was null and void, merely asked for the dismissal of the action with costs. The position taken by the city was that the immovable property of the Association is only entitled to exemption when it is owned and occupied by the corporation for the purposes of the corporation.
The action was tried in the Recorder's Court of Chicoutimi and the Recorder gave judgment in favour of the city for the amount of its claim, less the sum of $94.35. The property in question is owned by the appellant and consists of a large building in which there are offices, a theatre, a skating rink, badminton courts, billiard rooms, bowling alleys and restaurants. Part of the building, the theatre, is leased for use for the exhibition of moving pictures at a rental of $2,000 per year plus a share in the profits.
One of the offices is rented to a Mr. Murdock at $40 per month and another office is rented at $25 per month.
The Arena is used in the winter for skating and hockey games and in the summer months is leased from time to time for professional wrestling at the rate of $40 V. per evening.
A general admission fee to the public is charged for the skating rink, the bowling alleys, the billiard rooms, the badminton courts, etc. Apparently there is no difference in the admission fee depending on whether one of the public is a member of the Association or not.
The Recorder on the evidence came to the conclusion that the whole building was really used for commercial purposes and gain but he did think that two small rooms in the building might be regarded as used solely for the purposes of the Association;
and the Recorder accordingly reduced the respondent's claim by $94.35.
The appellant Association appealed against this judgment to the Court of King's Bench which by a majority affirmed the judgment. The appellant has now appealed to this Court.
It is clear upon the statute that the exemption is only while the property is owned and occupied by the corporation for the purposes of the corporation.
Now the building cannot be assessed piecemeal; you cannot take two or three rooms out of a large office building, for instance, leave them free from taxation and yet tax all the other rooms in the building. The building is either taxable or it is not taxable. The city very naturally, as its counsel states, did not appeal from the judgment which gave it its entire claim except $94.35. What the city says is that if it had any right of appeal, which it doubts, in respect of the amount of the small deduction, it was not worth the costs of an appeal and the city was quite content to let the small item go.
Whatever may be said as to the occupation of several different parts of the building, it is not disputed that two portions are rented for private office use and the theatre portion is leased on a yearly basis.
On a fair interpretation of the statutory provision, the corporation to be entitled to exemption must occupy the immovable property for its own purposes and it cannot be said to occupy the immovable property when any substantial portion of it is in the occupation of others. The statute is not satisfied by showing that the corporation occupies CmnoouTIMI. some portion of the building for its own purposes. Davis J.
For these reasons I am of opinion that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
TASCHEREAU J.-L'appellante, l'Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Canadienne-Frangaise, a 6t6 incorpor6e par 7 Geo. V, chapitre 110. En 1932, en vertu du statut 22, Geo. V, chapitre 136, sa charte a 6t0 amend6e et certaines exemptions de taxes municipales et scolaires lui ont 6t0 accord6es.
L'article 3 de la dite loi telle que revis6e se lit de la fagon suivante:- 3. L'objet de la corporation est d'assurer A ses membres un compl6ment de formation personnelle au moyen de cercles d'6tudes, et de travailler au succhs des entreprises d'utilit6 publique qui se rapportent & la charit6, A l'6ducation et aux questions morales, sociales, nationales et 6conomiques.
L'article 4 est ainsi r6dig6:- 4. La corporation aura succession perp6tuelle, et pourra:
Avoir un sceau commun et le modifier A volont6; ester en justice; fonder des cercles d'6tudes, organiser des cours, des conf6rences, des journies d'6tudes et des congris, pour la poursuite de son objet; fonder et maintenir des bibliothiques et des salles de lecture; acheter, imprimer, 6diter, publier et vendre des revues, livres, journaux, brochures et feuilles de propagande assortis A ses desseins et A son objet; fonder, installer et 6quiper, pour l'usage de ses membres et du public, des 6tablissements pour I'enseignement et la pratique de la culture physique et des exercices athl6tiques ou sportifs; accepter, acquirir et recevoir, par achat, donation, testament, legs ou autrement, et poss6der des biens meubles et immeubles, en retirer des revenus, pourvu que le revenu annuel des immeubles appartenant A la corporation et poss6d6s par elle pour des fins de revenu n'excide pas deux cent mille dollars; les louer, vendrc, changer, hypoth6quer, c~der, alidner ou autrement en disposer; emprunter, 6mettre des obligations (debentures) garanties par hypothiques, par gage ou nantissement, s'il y a lieu; percevoir de ses membres des cotisations, contributions, souscriptions et abonnements; encourager les 6tudes et les cauvres qui se rapportent A l'objet de l' A.CJ.C.; organiser des concours, fonder des prix, attribuer des r6compenses; aider et soutenir, dans la mesure de leurs besoins et des ressources de la corporation, des entreprises propres A r6pandre la culture de l'esprit et A assurer la d6fense des La ville de Chicoutimi oft est situ6 l'immeuble de l'appelante a institu6 des procedures l6gales contre celle-ci pour lui r6clamer la somme de $4,060.64 repr6sentant les taxes municipales et scolaires pour les ann6es 1936 et 1937, ainsi que les int6rits. L'appelante a r6pondu qu'elle ne devait pas le montant parce que l'immeuble est possid6 et occup6 par elle pour les fins mentionn6es h la loi qui 1'incorpore, et que les r6glements, r6solutions, ainsi que les r6les d'6valuation et de perception invoquis par l'intim6e sont ill6gaux et ultra vires. Le Recorder de Chicoutimi devant qui la cause a 6t6 instruite a partiellement admis cette pr6tention de l'appelante.
Il en est venu A la conclusion que la majeure partie de l'immeuble 6tait taxable, que le reste ne l'6tait pas, et il a maintenu Faction pour la somme de $3,966.29 avec int6rits et d6pens.
Cet immeuble qui fait l'objet du pr6sent litige est connu sous le num6ro P. 233 et P. 234 du cadastre de la ville de Chicoutimi.
L'appelante n'occupe pas cet immeuble en entier.
Elle a lou6 un th6htre h un particulier qui 1'exploite pour son b6n6fice personnel; elle a aussi lou6 une piece a un monsieur Murdock qui l'occupe comme bureau, une salle de 55 par 60 pieds au Syndicat Catholique, et quelques petits restaurants attenant aux pieces ci-dessus mentionnies. Le reste de la bqtisse, comprenant le bureau de 1'aum6nier, et la salle de l'Association ne sont pas lou6s et sont occup6s par l'appelante.
Dans l'immeuble se trouve 6galement une patinoire. La preuve r6vble que cette patinoire n'est pas loude et h cet cet endroit, durant 1'hiver, on y donne des exhibitions payantes de hockey, et durant d'autres saisons des s6ances de lutte.
Je partage 1'opinion du Recorder de Chicoutimi et celle de la majorit6 des juges de la Cour du Banc du Roi qui en sont venus h la conclusion que le th6Atre, 'arena, le bureau occup6 par monsieur Murdock, la salle du syndicat catholique ainsi que les trois restaurants constituent pour l'appelante des sources de revenus et ne sauraient en cons6quence bindficier de 'exemption de taxes pr6vue au statut.
L'appelante n'a pas plus de droits que les LA communaut6s religieuses et les maisons de charit6, car 1'acte l6gislatif qui l'incorpore la place sur le mime pied j que celles-ci.
La clause cr6ant 1'exemption de taxes municipales et scolaires ne trouve son application que lorsque les propri6tis sont occup6es par des institutions religieuses ou charitables, pour les fins pour lesquelles elles ont 6t6 6tablies, et non pas uniquement pour en retirer un revenu. (Vide loi des cites et des villes, art. 520; loi de 1'Instruction Publique, art. 251.)
Il en est ainsi de l'immeuble de l'appelante.
Quand le statut d6crite que les immeubles poss6d6s et occup6s par elle pour les "fins susdites ", sont assimilds aux biens des maisons d'6ducation quant aux exemptions de taxes municipales et scolaires, je crois qu'il faut voir dans les mots "fins susdites" une r6f6rence A la section 3 de la loi qui d6finit les objets de l'A.C.J.C., et non pas h la section 4 qui donne les moyens d'atteindre ces objets. Il semble clair que le th6Atre, l'arena et quelques autres pibces de l'immeuble constituent des sources de revenus, et ne sont pas occup6s par l'appelante pour les fins qui lui permettent d'atteindre les objets mentionn6s h l'article 3 de sa charte. Mime si les revenus sont vers&s au fonds g6ndral de l'appelante, I'immeuble serait taxable, car c'est 1'usage que 1'on fait de l'immeuble qu'il faut consid6rer et non pas 1'usage des revenus de cet immeuble.
Mais, nous dit 1'appelante, le bureau de l'aum6nier et la salle de l'Association sont occup6s par elle et servent A assurer h ses membres un complement de formation personnelle et h atteindre ainsi l'objet de la corporation. Cette partie de l'immeuble n'6tait pas taxable, et a 6t6 tout de m~me impos6e par la ville.
Cette imposition de taxe 6tant ill6gale, il s'ensuivrait que tout le rble quant h l'appelante est nul, et on nous cite de nombreuses autoritis pour appuyer cette pr6tention. C'est ainsi que dans son factum et h l'argument l'appelante a citO les causes de Toronto Railway Co. v. Toronto Corporation (1);
Donohue v. La Corporation de la Paroisse de St-Etienne de la Malbaie (2); Montreal Light, Heat & Power v. Cit6 de Westmount (3).
Dans la premiere de ces causes,
Toronto Railway Co. v. Toronto Corporation (4), il a
6t d6cid6 ce qui suit (p. 815):- LACVTDE It appears to their Lordships that the jurisdiction of the Court of Revision and of the Courts exercising the statutory jurisdiction of appeal TaschraU J from the Court of Revision, is confined to the question whether the assess-Tsea ment was too high or too low, and those Courts had no jurisdiction to determine the question whether the assessment commissioner had exceeded his powers in assessing property which was not by law assessable.
In other words, where the assessment was ab initio a nullity they had no jurisdiction to confirm it or give it validity.
Et plus loin, A la mime page:- In Nickle v. Douglns (5) the exact point arose.
The appellant had unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Revision, and it was held, after an elaborate examination of the previous authorities in the English and
Canadian Courts, that that Court had no jurisdiction to decide any question whether particular property was assessable, and also that the party was not 'estopped by having previously appealed to the Revision
Court.
In London Mutual Insurance Co. v. City of London (6), the decision of the county court judge was treated as final, because the question was within the jurisdiction of the assessor.
Dans la cause de Donohue v. La Corporation de la paroisse de St-Etienne de la Malbaie (7), le juge Anglin dit
A la page 516:- The appellants' machinery was non-assessable.
In assessing the appellants in respect of it the assessors were dealing with something beyond their jurisdiction. The assessment was therefore a nullity and neither appeal from it nor action to question the roll for illegality in respect of it was necessary.
Et plus loin:- In the Shannon case (8) the subject-matter of the assessment was admittedly within the jurisdiction of the assessors; it was over-valuation that was complained of; that over-valuation was charged to be the result of a systematic disregard of the prescribed principles of assessment.
Dans la cause de Montreal Light, Heat & Power v. City of Westmount (9), il a 6t6 d6cid6 par cette Cour que
Faction de la cit6 de Westmount au montant de $8,226.86 devait 6tre rejet6e, parce que ce montant repr6sentait des
(1) [19041 A.C. 809, at 814.
(5) (1875) 37 U.C. (Q.B.) 51.
(2) [19241 S.C.R. 511, at 516.
(6) (1887) Ont. A.R. 629.,
(3) [19261 S.C.R. 515.
(7) [19241 S.C.R. 511.
(4) [19041 A.C. 809, at 814.
(8) [19241 A.C. 185.
(9) [1926] A.C. 515.
taxes sur l'6valuation de compteurs 6lectriques qui 6taient install6s dans des maisons priv6es. La Cour a d~cid6 que compteurs n'6taient pas des immeubles, et non seulement I'action a 6t6 rejete inais le r8le quant A la Montreal Light, Heat & Power a t6 annuld.
A ciP
Le cas qui nous occupe est bien diff6rent. L'immeuble dans son ensemble constitue une source de revenus pour l'appelante, et m~me s'il n'6tait pas productif de revenus, i serait encore taxable, A moins qu'il ne soit d6montr6 qu'il sert A atteindre l'objet de la corporation qui est, encore une fois:- C'est A cette seule condition que l'immeuble est assimil4 aux maisons d'6ducation.
importait donc A 1'appelante de d6montrer 1'application de la loi exceptionnelle qui la rigit. La preuve r6vile au contraire que dans le bureau de l'aum6nier qui, avec un monsieur Gagnon, est le g6rant de l'immeuble, se contr6lent les diverses operations financibres, se pergoivent les loyers, et s'exercent la censure des vues cin6matographiques.
Quant A la salle oii se trouve une bibliothbque, je partage l'opinion du Recorder, de M. le juge Barclay et de M. le juge Galipeault,. qui ne sont pas satisfaits de la preuve apport6e par l'appelante pour soustraire cette partie de l'immeuble A l'imposition des taxes foncibres.
En quoi cette salle et le bureau de l'aumonier serventils aux " fins susdites "? II est possible qu'il en soit ainsi, et que dans cette salle et le bureau de 1'aumonier on pose des actes qui soient de nature A aider la corporation a atteindre les fins mentionn6es A sa charte. Mais il faut le prouver, et non pas se contenter d'affirmations g6ndrales et impr6cises qui ne nous 6clairent pas sur la v6ritable nature des ceuvres accomplies.
A difaut de cette preuve positive qui incombe A l'appelante, je ne puis me permettre de faire des conjectures, et je ne puis pas pr6sumer que ces pieces de 1'immeuble servent A des travaux d'utilit6 publique, d'6ducation, de charit6, ou A des ceuvres oil se discutent des questions morales, sociales, nationales et 6conomiques.
II est vrai que le Recorder exempte l'appelante des taxes payables pour le bureau de 'aum6nier et la salle, mais, apris avoir d6montr6 que le tout doit 6tre tax6, il s'exprime de la fagon suivante:
Evidemment, le Recorder ne conclut pas suivant les faits prouvds. Mais, parce qu'il riduit la r6clamation de la ville de $94.35, ou de $47.17 par annie, devons-nous pour cela decider que tout le r8le est nul et que l'appel doit 6tre maintenu?
Je ne le crois pas, et je ne suis pas pr~t A me rallier A cette opinion. La ville de Chicoutimi n'a pas loge de contreappel. Elle a agi sagement, car il est douteux qu'elle eft le droit de le faire, et le montant en jeu 6tait si minime qu'il n'en valait pas la peine. Ce que j'ai dit pr6cidemment indique que si semblable contre-appel efit 6t6 log6, pour ma part je 1'aurais maintenu.
Son d6faut de le faire ne fait perdre A la ville que cette somme de $94.35 mais aucun autre de ses droits. Ce serait jeter la confusion dans les affaires municipales de l'intim6e que d'annuler tout le r8le quant A l'appelante.
L'appel doit 6tre rejet6 avec d~pens.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Cases cited
- A.C. 515 A.C. 515